Robert Rabil Responds to my Op-Ed: Carrots or only Sticks?

Robert Rabil, director of graduate studies at Florida Atlantic University, who has written much of the most intelligent and interesting analysis on Lebanon and Syria for the influential think tank, the Washington Institute of Near East Policy, has commented on my op-ed with his own article in the "Daily Star." I will write a comment below. Here is his article.

The real message of U.S. pressure on Syria - Robert G. Rabil
Since the adoption by the UN Security Council of Resolution 1559, which authorized an independent commission to investigate the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, ironically a debate has raged more over the role played by Washington in issuing the resolution than over the possible implication of Damascus in the assassination. In fact, the Resolution was issued upon the recommendation of a UN fact-finding mission, which concluded that "the government of Syria bears primary responsibility for the political tension that preceded the assassination."

Some scholars and analysts perceive Washington's interest in pursuing the investigation as part of an overall effort to overthrow the Syrian regime. They argue that Washington is pursuing a policy of regime change on the cheap in Damascus, Syria's liberal opposition groups are not prepared to govern, Syria's deep religious animosities and ethnic hatred could easily tear the country apart if the government falls and would thus result in bringing to power militant Sunnis who would actively aid the jihadists in Iraq, and that Damascus and Washington have a mutual interest in subduing jihadism and stabilizing Iraq.

They criticize Washington's erratic policy and assert that the U.S. must choose between destabilizing Syria and stabilizing Iraq. Recently, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad welcomed a group of American academics who, according to the Arab media, opposed the Iraq war. Their meeting with Assad could be interpreted as a message critical of Washington.

This line of thinking is confused and misguided on both strategic and tactical levels. From a strategic standpoint Washington and Damascus have different objectives in the region. Washington's invasion of Iraq and promotion of democracy in the Middle East have not only shattered the regional status quo, around which Syria built its reputation as the vanguard of Arab nationalism, but have also threatened the very survival of the Syrian Baath regime. Consequently, Damascus has a strategic interest in undermining U.S. policies in the Middle East in general and in Iraq in particular.

This is borne out by Syria's policy until very recently of turning a blind eye to jihadi infiltration into Iraq. Even, Iraq's Defense Minister Saadoun al-Doulaimi recently lambasted Syria for allowing insurgents to sneak into Iraq. But Syria has set itself into a dangerous trap. The very jihadists it allowed into Iraq are coming back into Syria and fomenting trouble. Admittedly, Damascus may consider helping bring stability to Iraq only if it would have a say in formulating Iraq's political future, something Washington has been adamantly against.

On the other hand, the Hariri assassination cannot be looked at in isolation of the regional developments. It is no less associated with Syria's attempts at undermining U.S. regional efforts than with preventing the mobilization of Lebanon's political and confessional groups against Syria's occupation of the country. Not only did Hariri project domestic and universal influence but also reflected a central aspect of Washington's policies by insisting on economic and political reform. Liquidating Hariri could thus be perceived as removing a domestic obstacle in Lebanon and undercutting a "leg" of Washington's diplomacy.

Similarly, it is not apt to consider pressure on Syria as an attempt to remove the Syrian regime on the cheap. On the one hand, international pressure on Syria, led by the U.S. and France, has accomplished significant results, freeing Lebanon after almost three decades of Syrian occupation and leading to the collapse of Beirut's security regime. Four senior security officials are now under arrest facing charges of complicity in murder. Something of this magnitude has rarely occurred in the Arab world. Lebanon could become a catalyst of political change in the region.
On the other hand, one could argue that pressure on the regime has reinforced the hands of Bashar vis-a-vis the "old guard." Bashar has used the regime change pretext to try to consolidate his rule. Close members and supporters of the Assad Alawite clan have taken control of almost all military and security apparatus while at the same time nearly all the old-timers of the regime were led to retirement.

Significantly, by affirming the inviolability of the Baath Party during the recent tenth Baath Regional Congress, being the vanguard party in society, Bashar sent a message to the opposition as well as to Washington that his Baath regime was "here to stay."

Historically, the regime survived the aftershocks of the defeat in the 1967 war at a time when it was extremely weak. Nor has the regime had any qualms using whatever means at its disposal to suppress internal opposition. Thousands of Muslim brothers and supporters were killed and jailed in 1982 when they rebelled against the regime. What partly saved the day was the support of the regime by the Damascene merchant class. Although this influential class has called for reforms, it is more concerned with stability than unchecked change.

Washington's policy toward Syria, by error or trial, has the effect of neutralizing Syria by forcing it to stop hedging its diplomacy ranging from promoting terror to seeking regional power. The international investigation is more a signal to Syria and other rogue states that the language of violence is nearing its end. In this respect, it is foolish to consider that Washington's choice is between destabilizing Syria and stabilizing Iraq.

Robert G. Rabil is director of graduate studies at Florida Atlantic University and author of Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel, and Lebanon (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). He wrote this article for The Daily Star.[End]

Comment: Robert does not dispute my primary thesis - that regime change on the cheap will lead to chaos or worse in Syria and backfire against American interests. (By the way, I believe that faced with a sudden government collapse, Syria would likely slip into chaos and possible civil war, rather than produce a stable government run by Islamists. I don't think Extremists have the ability, organization, or popularity among Syrians to take power. Maybe at the end of a brutal civil war they would emerge victorious once everyone has been radicalized, but not before.) Anyway, Robert doesn't dispute that something worse for American interests would likely happen in Syria should the government collapse.

What he does say is that US foreign policy, which he admits has been "erratic" and thus inscrutable, is not directed at regime change. To suggest that people in Washington have been hoping for regime change, Rabil insists - "is not apt."

OK, let's agree with Rabil for the sake of discussion. Washington agrees on a Syria policy and does not want regime change. Most likely, Washington has sobered up on the regime-change issue now that it must decide what to do with the Hariri investigation. The possibility of pushing Syria until it "pops" is a real concern, which Washington probably does not welcome at this point.

Robert argues that pressure works and is a good tool for forcing Syria to conform to American and Lebanese interests. Here again, we agree. I believe pressure has worked and will continue to work. The greatest evidence of this is Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, as Robert says.

Where we disagree, is over the issue of whether the US should also offer Syria carrots to shape its policy. I think, "Yes," the US should do this. The main reason Rabil doesn't think carrots are a good idea, he writes, is because:

Damascus may consider helping bring stability to Iraq only if it would have a say in formulating Iraq's political future, something Washington has been adamantly against.

What Rabil is saying, if I read him correctly, is that Washington cannot draw Asad into a deal on Iraq because it will not accept Asad having "a say in formulating Iraq's political future."

Why not? Syria's main connection to Iraq is with the tribal confederations that populate Syria’s eastern provinces and Iraq’s western provinces. Syria has allowed the tribal leaders to meet openly in the Sham hotel. Most of the Iraqi leaders I have spoken to in Damascus - the Dulaimi types - are against the Shiite Imams taking over, they don't want Iran to have too much influence in Iraq, and they support former PM Allawi, and want a "secular" coalition of Sunnis and Shiites to rule in Baghdad. Everyone of them I talked to told me, “We don’t want the United States to leave Iraq now. We want them to pursue a smarter policy and listen to the Sunnis.”

This is not so far from what the US says its goals are. The United States supported Prime Minister Allawi in the last elections and were disappointed when he lost at the polls. America says it wants a balance of Sunni and other groups in Iraq, rather than the lop-sided Shiite control that is now emerging. Why not use Syria to counter-balance Iran? This would be wise policy. It needs to bring in the Sunni tribes, which Bashar has been cultivating. There are grounds for dialogue on this.

As I explained the other day, the last paragraph of my original op-ed (which was cut) suggested that the US ask Bashar to use its influence with the Sunni tribes to protect the oil pipeline that runs from Kirkuk in northern Iraq to Banyas on the Syria coast. It is the most efficient means of getting Iraq's northern oil out of the country, but was closed by the US when it invaded Iraq in order to punish Syria. Washington has not permitted it to be reopened. Iraq's northern oil has not been exploitable for the last year because the Iraqi resistance has been blowing up the pipelines to Turkey. Let Asad try to work with the Iraqi tribes to get the oil flowing. What does America have to lose? Syria was making 1.5 billion dollars a year out of this oil before the American invasion of Iraq. It has a large incentive to help stabilize Iraq if it can get this revenue back. So long as America refuses to let Iraq run its oil out through Syria, Damascus has an incentive to try to push America out of Iraq as quickly as possible in order to get the pipeline turned back on. America should exploit Syria’s interest in opening the pipeline to get Syria on the side of stabilizing Iraq. It would be to everyone’s benefit.
Using such a carrot does not mean America must forgo the Hariri investigation or its other sticks. It can do both. Asad will be more likely to cooperate, and Syrians will see a real interest in siding with the American program in Iraq - and perhaps elsewhere. If Asad behaves, he gets more carrots and less sticks. It would also convince Damascus that the United States does not want regime-change. What Asad fears now is that even if he cooperates with America, he will be driven to the wall. Under these conditions, he will not cooperate. It is a matter of regime survival.

Take away the regime-survival question and show Syria that there is a light at the end of the tunnel, and Asad will head for the light. It is natural human behavior. It is not rocket science. Hence, I continue to believe that the question is between destabilizing Syria and stabilizing Iraq. Show Asad that America does not want regime change and that there is a possibility of cooperation, and he will respond.

One more point, Rabil struck a low blow, when he wrote:

[US academics who]criticize Washington's erratic policy and assert that the U.S. must choose between destabilizing Syria and stabilizing Iraq. Recently, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad welcomed a group of American academics who, according to the Arab media, opposed the Iraq war. Their meeting with Assad could be interpreted as a message critical of Washington.

I take it that Robert is trying to imply that I joined some "group of American academics" who oppose the Iraq war and wanted to express their opposition by meeting with Bashar al-Asad. I did no such thing and would not do it. If I opposed the Iraq war, I certainly wouldn't meet with Asad in order to announce it.

I do not know of any America scholars who are in Damascus who met with Asad because of their opposition to the Iraq war. I did read this report in the local press, though, and it confused me as it has Rabil. What I think happened is this: A conference on Syrian history is being held this week in Damascus. A few American scholars, who work on 19th century Syrian history, are participating. I am not. Probably the local press used their presence in Damascus to write that they opposed the war. Maybe Bashar al-Asad turned up at the opening session of the conference to welcome them - but I do not know if this is true. I will find out.

Anyway, for Robert to suggest that my article, which argued that America must choose between stabilizing Iraq and destabilizing Syria, has anything to do with American academics who oppose the war and give allegiance to Bashar over George is just mendacity. There is no connection between the two. This is not a question about which president is better or whose side one is on. To reduce this discussion to such a level of national allegiance should be left to Campus Watch. Rabil should not stoop so low.

There is a real debate going on about what America should do in Syria to stabilize Iraq. I think Washington can be smarter. Robert thinks Washington is on the right track and doing the best it can. He doesn't think carrots will work. I do. We agree that pressure is effective. We agree that sudden regime change is dangerous. It is not a question of whose side one is on but what policy will help stabilize Iraq.