"Syria Can be a Stabilizing Force" by Uri Sagi, Ex IDF Intelligence Chief

Haaretz interview with Uri Sagi who headed the IDF Intelligence Corps for four years (1991-1995) [Kindly sent by Camille-Alexandre Otrakji]

If you talk to [Syria] and convince the Americans to provide them with economic aid and perhaps to gently back off on Assad regarding the Hariri assassination, Syria, with all its weakness, can be a stabilizing force in the region."

Negotiations with Syria

A question about the fighter planes that buzzed over Syrian President Bashar Assad's palace elicits a chuckle from Sagi. "That was pompous behavior that does not in any way enhance our deterrent ability. Assad doesn't need these displays to know that Israel is a lot stronger than him. He has gotten enough hints. If you want to shoot - shoot, don't talk."

It is not that he is suggesting taking aim at Syria. On the contrary. Sagi, who headed the Israeli team negotiating with Syria and spent hundreds of hours talking to key Syrian figures, defines the break with Syria as "a fatal error."

According to him, Israel is blindly following the Americans, who think that because there has been a decline in Syria's importance, it can be totally ignored.

"I told Dan Kurtzer (the previous U.S. ambassador to Israel), that hatred is not a policy. His answer was 'so go ahead and talk to them and we won't object.'" Unfortunately, since the negotiations were stopped during the Barak government's tenure, Israel has not seen fit to establish a channel for dialogue with Damascus and lost the most important leverage it had with the Lebanese government. "Israel was insulted and is using military force in Lebanon, and that's important and perhaps even necessary," continues Sagi, "but without a new arrangement in Lebanon the benefits of this operation will go down the drain. Everyone understands that the only ones capable of changing the order are Syria and Iran, or a determined international equivalent. Lebanon will not be able to do it alone."

Sagi believes that six years ago, Israel missed a rare opportunity to sign a peace treaty with Syria under Hafez Assad. "The United States did not stand by its word to Assad and Barak got cold feet at the last minute." He wants to believe that the day is not far off when the younger Assad will finish the job and even surpass his father. He is convinced that the key to Israel's long-term security problems lies with Syria: the options of neutralizing the actual Syrian threat, a road to an arrangement with Lebanon and even opening a window through it to Iran are all in Syria. He notes that the Iranians in 1991 gave Syria a green light to join the Madrid Conference and promised not to disrupt the negotiations with Barak.

Sagi has argued for years that it is easier to reach an agreement with the Arab countries, including Syria, than it is to reach one with the Palestinians, because the conflict with them involves fewer holy sites and less messianic fervor.

"Imagine if we were to wage a fight against Hamas and Hezbollah when we have a peace agreement with Syria, Jordan and Egypt," he says. Sagi points out that during the negotiations with Syria, it was agreed that upon the signing of a peace agreement, they would close all offices of Palestinian terrorist organizations. He notes that Assad was tough to work with, but after he signed an agreement, he upheld it down the last letter.

"I don't want people to gather from my remarks that I think that the Syrians are real saints," Sagi concludes, "but if you talk to them and convince the Americans to provide them with economic aid and perhaps to gently back off on Assad regarding the Hariri assassination, Syria, with all its weakness, can be a stabilizing force in the region." In the midst of a war of missiles, Sagi insists that peace and stability are "a security factor of the utmost importance." To those who don't believe it, he suggests taking a walk along the border with Egypt and Jordan.