Anonymous Syrianist and Rabinovich argue "Talks with Syria, - Yes - But Not Now"

I quote a long response to my latest post by a friend and fellow Syrianist, whom I respect. He disagrees that Syria should be brought into negotiations at the present time, arguing that this would squander the gains for Lebanon's sovereignty that have been achieved over the last year. My friend is in excellent company.

Itamar Rabinovich, writing in Haaretz: "Talks with Syria, yes - but not now" argues along the same lines. This is an important article and should be read by all Syrians. Rabinovich is the best Israeli Syrianist who has also served his country as a diplomat with great wisdom. He helped lead the Israeli dialogue with Syria during the 1990s and has been writing on Syria for over 40 years. Every article he has written on Syria is a gem.

Here is my friend’s analysis. He asked not to be named.

Historical analogies are useful, but can also be pushed too far. A lot has changed since the 1980s – in the role of Hizballah, in the position of Syria,, in the standing of the Lebanese state, in the regional context, and in international system more broadly. And these changes suggest a more robust basis for U.S. policy than you acknowledge - despite its many evident flaws.

Syria’s presence in Lebanon has weakened considerable relative to the 1980s. The incomplete (and now damaged) effort to make Lebanese sovereignty a reality is (still) further along than at any time since the end of the civil war, in no small part thanks to Syria’s own mis-handling of its role in Lebanon. You earlier summed up the situation in the sound bite: “Bashar lost Lebanon, but he won Syria.” Your analysis made sense then. It still does, even taking changes on the ground into account.

One of the many questions facing the U.S. at this point is what posture it should take vis a vis Lebanon as a sovereign state, and it seems to me that this is the wrong moment to take actions that would undermine this standing – or weaken its future prospects further than they have been already. For a lot of reasons, it is politically useful to treat Lebanon *as if* it is a sovereign state, to expect that Syria’s relationship with Lebanon will be guided by the norms and standards of international relations between sovereign states, and to take the view that Syria does not automatically and legitimately exercise a veto over the arrangements by which Lebanon and the states that are parties to this conflict (in which Syria is not directly involved as a participant–whatever its clandestine role), negotiate a settlement.

Of course we know the reality is different. The Lebanese state is a shell. Syria is a power-broker in Lebanon. Syria supports Hizballah to generate instability that it feels gives it leverage in its relationship with Israel, and so on (though it is fair to ask whether a strategy that Syria has pursued for 25 years but has delivered nothing positive thus far – and has imposed significant costs on Lebanon – is one that should, at this moment, be validated by U.S. and Israeli recognition).

Still, for diplomatic and tactical reasons, it is not inappropriate for the U.S. to treat Lebanon as sovereign, for Rice to avoid visiting Damascus first (what a great signal that would be about Lebanese sovereignty), and to treat Syria as a concerned party but not one that has a veto over what happens inside Lebanon. These reasons include our sense that we prefer to see Hizballah occupy exclusively a political role in the future; our modest hope that the conflict might lead to a debate about the political accommodation on which Lebanese politics will be organized in the future – and might even, finally, give Lebanon’s Shi`a the standing they deserve; and the even more modest hope that this debate will take place under conditions in which the shadow of Syrian influence over Lebanon is diminished.

None of this implies a policy of ostracizing Syria. It does not mean a policy that ignores reality on the ground, where Syria looms large. Yet neither does it suggest a basis for bringing Syria to the center of the diplomatic efforts to find a solution to this conflict, to validate Syrian claims to being a spoiler, to give credibility to the view that addressing Syrian claims is the only way to resolve “root causes” of the current conflict, or to permit Syria to dictate the kind of international presence that is needed to stabilize Lebanon’s southern border. The question is what kind of outcome would be preferable, from the U.S. perspective? One in which Syria’s role as a spoiler is validated, and Lebanon’s limited sovereignty further eroded? Or one in which the guiding assumptions provide a framework for the strengthening of Lebanese sovereignty and the transformation of Hizballah into a (no-doubt powerful) domestic political actor?

There’s no doubt at all that Syria will resist this strategy, and is already doing so in voicing its opposition to the kind of international presence that might actually constrain its behavior – as opposed to a larger version of the utterly inept UNIFIL which Syria seems to prefer. Hizballah will resist it, too, but it isn’t clear that Syrian-Hizballah interests are all that closely aligned on this issue -- and exploring/pushing these differences is a useful thing to do. Hizballah will have an important role in Lebanon in the future even with a robust international presence on the border. Syria’s options, however, will become much more limited. And at some point, the question of how far Hizballah is willing to sacrifice its longer-term political future in order to preserve Syrian options will be on the table. It won’t happen right away. The conflict is, for now, reinforcing Syrian-Hizballah relations. But it will be there in the future, and the way Hizballah answers that question - down the road - will depend in large part on how the U.S. and others treat Syria now, as we look for a way out of the current conflict.

Again, this doesn’t imply ignoring Syria, but it does suggest that a U.S. framework in which the foundations of the settlement being pursued should reinforce rather than undermine Lebanese sovereignty, should advance Hizballah’s transformation into a political rather than a military presence, and should not create the conditions in which Bashar wins back what he lost with the death of Harriri, is worth trying.

I am adding a bit of an Haaretz Editorial:

Opportunity on Syria's doorstep
By Haaretz Editorial
Last update - 03:08 31/07/2006

Thus, for example, one of the essentials of the settlement being formulated is based on Lebanon's wish to receive the Shaba Farms from Israel. The government of Prime Minister Fuad Siniora believes that this is the way to take away from Hezbollah one of its main excuses for continuing to hold arms, and to rally public support for its disarmament.

The transfer of Shaba Farms to Lebanon requires that Syria officially recognize that this territory is Lebanese and not Syrian, as it has been described to date. It can be assumed that Syria will pose its own conditions for making concessions on Shaba Farms, which will allow it to retain its influence both in Lebanon and the region. Herein lies the window of opportunity to which President George Bush referred to, most recently on Friday, when he called on Syria to become an active partner in peace in the Middle East.

It is possible that Bashar Assad is not a leader with the vision and courage necessary to make use of this window of opportunity which the war in Lebanon created, and it is possible that the best he can do is to retain hermetic control over the situation in Syria. However, this should not prevent Israel or the United States from presenting him with the basis for a different option.