News Round UP (11 September 2006)

A number of noteworthy articles have appeared this past week debating the pros and cons of engaging Syria. The most hard hitting on the con side are articles by Michael Young and Lee Smith. On the pro side is Flynt Leverett. "Illusion and Reality: The violence in the Middle East shows the negative consequences of the administration’s contempt for engagement. But the tough talk has failed," in The American Prospect, 09.12.06. Needless to say, I find Leverett, much more convincing than I do either of the con articles. They never explain how they are going to stop Syria from meddling, without regime change, and they don't explain how they hope to change the regime, which, at the end of the day, is the only solution for them. The Daily Star's editorial blasts Blair on the occasion of his Lebanon visit. They laud the Lebanese statesmen who refused to meet him, claiming, "Blair openly positioned himself as Hizbullah's enemy - and therefore Lebanon's." This small article on how Donald Rumsfeld forbade military strategists from even discussing an Iraq postwar plan is revealing. Army official: Rumsfeld forbade talk of postwar By Stephanie Heinatz Daily Press (Newport News, Va.)

FORT EUSTIS, Va. - Long before the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld forbade military strategists to develop plans for securing a postwar Iraq, the retiring commander of the Army Transportation Corps said Thursday. In fact, said Brig. Gen. Mark Scheid, Rumsfeld said "he would fire the next person" who talked about the need for a postwar plan. Rumsfeld did replace Gen. Eric Shinseki, the Army chief of staff in 2003, after Shinseki told Congress that hundreds of thousands of troops would be needed to secure postwar Iraq. Scheid, who is also the commander of Fort Eustis in Newport News, made his comments in an interview with The Daily Press. He retires in about three weeks. Scheid's comments are further confirmation of the version of events reported in "Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq," the book by New York Times reporter Michael R. Gordon and retired Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Bernard E. Trainor. In 2001, Scheid was a colonel with the Central Command, the unit that oversees U.S. military operations in the Mideast. On Sept. 10, 2001, he was selected to be the chief of logistics war plans. On Sept. 11, he said, "life just went to hell." That day, Gen. Tommy Franks, the commander of Central Command, told his planners, including Scheid, to "get ready to go to war." A day or two later, Rumsfeld was "telling us we were going to war in Afghanistan and to start building the war plan. We were going to go fast. "Then, just as we were barely into Afghanistan, Rumsfeld came and told us to get ready for Iraq." Scheid said he remembers everyone thinking, "My gosh, we're in the middle of Afghanistan, how can we possibly be doing two at one time? How can we pull this off? It's just going to be too much." Planning was kept very hush-hush in those early days. "There was only a handful of people, maybe five or six, that were involved with that plan because it had to be kept very, very quiet." There was already an offensive plan in place for Iraq, Scheid said. And in the beginning, the planners were just expanding on it. "Whether we were going to execute it, we had no idea," Scheid said. Eventually other military agencies like the transportation and Army materiel commands had to get involved. They couldn't just "keep planning this in the dark," Scheid said. Planning continued to be a challenge. "The secretary of defense continued to push on us that everything we write in our plan has to be the idea that we are going to go in, we're going to take out the regime, and then we're going to leave," Scheid said. "We won't stay." Scheid said the planners continued to try "to write what was called Phase 4," or the piece of the plan that included post-invasion operations like security, stability and reconstruction. Even if the troops didn't stay, "at least we have to plan for it," Scheid said. "I remember the secretary of defense saying that he would fire the next person that said that," Scheid said. "We would not do planning for Phase 4 operations, which would require all those additional troops that people talk about today. "He said we will not do that because the American public will not back us if they think we are going over there for a long war." Even if the people who laid out the initial war plans had fleshed out post-invasion missions, the fighting and insurgent attacks going on today would have been hard to predict, Scheid said. "We really thought that after the collapse of the regime we were going to do all these humanitarian type things," he said. "We thought this would go pretty fast and we'd be able to get out of there. We really didn't anticipate them to continue to fight the way they did or come back the way they are. "Now we're going more toward a Civil War. We didn't see that coming." While Scheid, a soldier since 1977, spoke candidly about the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq, he remains concerned about the U.S. public's view of the troops. He's bothered by the nationwide divide over the war and fearful that patriotism among citizens will continue to decline. "We're really hurting right now," he said.

Cyprus finds air defense systems on Syria-bound ship: Washington Post. Interpol told Cypriot authorities the ship, the Gregorio I, which had been loaded in China and North Korea and was destined for Latakia, was carrying ballistic missile components. Cyprus searched the ship only to discover that it contained air defense systems and not weapons. They are trying to figure out what to do with it now. This is the first indication of the power of UN resolution 1701. Assad, Lahoud ordered Hariri murder: former Syrian officer Agence France Presse

BEIRUT, Sept 10, 2006 (AFP) - An exiled former Syrian intelligence officer has claimed that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his Lebanese counterpart, Emile Lahoud, ordered the assassination last year of former Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri.

"Bashar al-Assad and Emile Lahoud gave the orders for Hariri's murder," Mohammed Zuhair as-Saddiq was quoted by the Beirut daily An-Nahar Sunday as saying in an interview with the Dubai-based Al-Arabiya satellite television channel. "No other Syrian or Lebanese officer could have done this," he said in the interview broadcast Saturday night. Saddiq also claimed that "former Lebanese officials and certain Arab officials", whom he did not identify to Al-Arabiya, "also participated in this crime". Saddiq, a former colonel in Damascus' intelligence service who was speaking from Paris, also claimed that he had seen the car used to kill Hariri and 22 other people in a massive explosion on the Beirut seafront on February 14, 2005. "I saw it with my own eyes," Saddiq said of the car, which he said had been prepared for the attack at a camp in Zabadani, near Damascus. "I gave photos of it to Detlev Mehlis," who was the first head of a United Nations probe into the assassination, widely blamed on Syria and its allies in Lebanon, and roundly denied by both. "I kept the negatives." Saddiq also claimed to have a tape recording of a conversation in which a Damascus official had encouraged him to recant. He said he had been promised "better arrangements" than those offered to Hassam Taher Hassam, another Syrian who had retracted similar claims to those of Saddiq in testimony to the UN panel. Saddiq, whose extradition Syria is seeking from France, also refuted Syrian media claims that there were 64 arrests warrants pending against him. He was arrested by French police at the request of Lahoud but was later released. "The French judiciary was convinced that I was a witness and not a criminal," he claimed. The UN probe has already implicated senior officials from Syria, which for decades was the power broker in its smaller neighbor. The United Nations is currently working with the Lebanese government to create an international court to try suspects in the case. UN Under Secretary General for Legal Affairs Nicolas Michel was in Beirut this week to discuss the mechanics of that proposal. He left on Friday, saying progress had been made but that a number of issues had been identified that still needed clarification.

Abdul Halim Khaddam's National Salvation Front has published a condemnation of Farid Ghadry's Syria Reform Party circular, demanding that Alawites head for the hills. Ghadry has latched onto a new strategy of late, which is to exploit the sectarian mistrust in Syria. He has condemned the Alawite religious sect for most of Syria's problems and is warning that the Alawite led regime will be toppled by November 8. He insists that Alawites must resign from their positions in government and head for the Coastal Mountains, should they wish to save their lives. Why November 8th? We don't know. Khaddam' group claims that this effort to provoke sectarian civil war in Syria goes against national interest and plays into the hands of Israel. Here is his full report. بيان صادر عن جبهة الخلاص الوطني نشرت بعض وسائل الإعلام تصريحات تضمنت دعوة المواطنين السوريين الذين ينتمون إلى الطائفة العلوية بمغادرة المدن والعودة إلى مناطقهم، كما تضمنت الطلب من المسؤولين العسكريين والمدنيين الذين ينتمون لهذه الطائفة، بمغادرة مراكز عملهم قبل الثامن من تشرين الثاني القادم، موعد سقوط النظام كما حددته هذه التصريحات التي زعمت أنها معلومات استقتها من أرفع المصادر الأميركية. إن جبهة الخلاص الوطني في سورية إذ تستنكر هذه التصريحات، وتدينها جملة وتفصيلاً.. لتؤكد مايلي : أولاً - إن إطلاق مثل هذه التصريحات يضرّ بالمصلحة الوطنية العليا، ومن شأنه إثارة فتنة طائفية في البلاد تخدم المصالح والأهداف الإسرائيلية. ثانياً - إن المواطنين السوريين، بغض النظر عن الطائفة التي ينتمون إليها، هم جزء أصيل من مكونات الشعب السوري ومن حقهم أن يعيشوا في أي مكان من وطنهم، وأن يتبوّأوا أيّ منصب يصلون إليه نتيجة الاختيار الشعبيّ الحر. وليس من حق أحد، كائناً من كان، فرداً أو دولة، أن يتجاوز هذا الحق الدستوري، ويمليَ على السوريين مكان إقامتهم أو طبيعة عملهم. ثالثاً - إن جبهة الخلاص الوطني في سورية، تطالب الحكومة الأميركية بإعلان موقفها من هذه التصريحات التي زعم صاحبها أنه استقاها من مصادر أميركية رفيعة المستوى . إن جبهة الخلاص الوطني في سورية، إذ تؤكد أن التغيير الديمقراطي في سورية، مشروع وطنيّ خالص، وترفض أيّ تدخّل أجنبيّ في الشأن الوطني السوري.. لتأمل من كلّ البعثيين ورجال النظام الشرفاء، أن يكونوا على مستوى الوعي والمسئولية، فيقفوا في صف الشعب، إلى جانب القوى الوطنية، للمشاركة في عملية التغيير الديمقراطي 10 أيلول (سبتمبر) 2006 جبهة الخلاص الوطني في سورية

Some Lebanese Want to be More Like Iraq

The last few days have seen Italy's PM Prodi claim that Syria would allow foreign border guards along its Lebanon frontier only to have it denied by Syria. Prodi says Syria's Assad has agreed 'in principle' to EU presence on border with Lebanon Syria denies Assad has agreed to European guards on border with Lebanon

Prodi's spokesman, Silvio Sircana, said later Saturday that Syria's denial was accurate, adding that Prodi had not said "border guards" would be deployed and that ANSA and the premier's office were mistaken. "I confirm that Prodi and Assad did not discuss troops or guards, but only EU personnel without uniforms or arms that will be at the disposal of the Syrian forces," Sircana said.

Meanwhile, Israel's outspoken MK Bishara is visiting Damascus with other Israeli MK's. He warns Syria of Israeli attack. Roee Nahmias 09.09.06

Arab MK arrives in Damascus with his party members, sends alarming message that 'Israel may launch onslaught in bid to restore deterrence' Roee Nahmias Published: 09.09.06, 19:46 National Democratic Assembly chairman, Knesset Member Azmi Bishara, arrived in Damascus on Friday and immediately began making public statements condemning the Israeli occupation of the territories. Bishara joined his party members, MKs Jamal Zahalka and Wasil Taha, as well as former MKs Muhammad Kanan and Mohammed Miari, who have been in the city since Thursday. In the course of his meeting with senior members of the ruling Baath party, Bishara warned Syria of the possibility that "Israel launch a preliminary offensive in more than one place, in a bid to overcome the internal crisis in the country and in an attempt to restore its deterrence capability." During the meeting, Bishara lauded Syria's support for the national rights of the Palestinians and Lebanon, and stressed that the motivation for the "American-Israeli attack" against Syria lies in Damascus' firm stances. "Syria is the last barrier standing before the strike," MK Bishara said. "The Palestinians living under the occupation have long realized the importance of adhering to the Arab option, in light of the scope of adventurous attempts to hurt their cultural and Arab identity," he added. In an interview with the Syrian news agency SANA, Bishara expressed support for Syria's position and the struggle it was conducting for "the liberation of its occupied lands." Bishara also stated that Syria had been put "under pressure due to the fact it has stood by the resistance and rejected the American hegemony in the region, because it insisted on freeing the occupied Arab outside the 1967 lines, and because it has stood up for the nations' right o resist the occupation." During the interview, Bishara declared: "We are Syria's allies and will continue to be in contact with it on the national level, through our well-known views." MK Zahalka explained that the visit in Damascus "was aimed at expressing solidarity with Syria, as well as discussing the recent developments in the region, particularly following the wild Israeli aggression against Lebanon."

This has predictably provoked outcries in Israel that he is a traitor. (See the comment section on the above article.) Lebanon is in the full throws of post-war debate. This NY Times article quotes two major Maronite za`ims - Gemayel and Chamoun. They believe the war has demonstrated the power of Hizbullah. Their answer to growing Muslim power is to advocate greater federalism a la Iraq, so Christians can protect themselves from Hizbullah, which they expect to gain greater parliamentary power. As Hizbullah makes its way into the center of Lebanese politics, the Maronites want to move toward the fringes. Washington can take some satisfaction from the fact that the Iraqi democratic example is having some impact. Lebanon Left to Face Most Basic of Issues War Exposes Deep Conflicts About the Nation's Identity and Its Future By Edward Cody Washington Post September 10, 2006; Page A20 Perhaps more important, they noted, was Nasrallah's postwar assertion that Hezbollah must be taken into account in government deliberations from here on out. The party ran for office in the last elections, gaining seats in parliament and two ministers in Siniora's cabinet. But Nasrallah seemed to be saying his group will be seeking more power now that, in his words, it has fought a war on Lebanon's behalf. A share of power that reflects the Shiites' true place in the population would probably change Lebanon's orientation significantly, the Sunni and Maronite observers predicted. But a refusal to acknowledge the demographic change and Hezbollah's enhanced status after the war, they said, would be a recipe for more intercommunal conflict. As a result, the timeless view from Gemayel's terrace may be in for a change. "I don't see Lebanon surviving as it is today," said Dori Chamoun, leader of the Maronite-based National Liberal party and son of a former president and longtime political figure, the late Camille Chamoun. "It is inevitable that the Christians will have a smaller share of the country. I only see one solution, cantonization. Everybody wants it. Nobody says it out loud." In a recent book, Gemayel proposed abandoning Lebanon's current system and replacing it with election of the president by popular vote and decentralization along the geographical lines that largely define where Muslims and Christians live in any case. "The institutions of Lebanon are tired," he said. "They are drained of their blood." The losers in such a change would largely be Sunni Muslims, Chamoun pointed out, because by and large they have not carved out sections of the country as theirs. Public Works Minister Mohamad Safadi, a Sunni who lives in Beirut, said he was discussing the problem with his wife recently and reassured her that, if worse comes to worst, they could always live in their weekend house -- in the quintessentially Christian port of Byblos. General Aoun - the other Maronite leader is hoping to ride the Hizbullah wave right over the walls of Baabda. INTERVIEW-Christian leader flays Lebanon's "mafia" cabinet By Alistair Lyon, Special Correspondent RABIYEH, Lebanon, Sept 10 (Reuters) -

Lebanon's government is clinging to power so it can steal foreign aid meant for reconstruction after Israel's war with Hizbollah guerrillas, Christian opposition leader Michel Aoun said on Sunday.... Aoun said he was not demanding at the moment that the incumbent, Syrian-backed President Emile Lahoud, resign. Parliament, which elects the president, has been dominated by an anti-Syrian coalition led by Saad Hariri, the son of slain former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, since the election. Aoun says the results were skewed by an unfair electoral law. "We can dissolve parliament and we can do elections," he said. "If not, okay, it will favour conflict and confrontation."...Some of Aoun's sympathisers found this baffling, while his critics accused him of political opportunism, but he dismisses as a "media plot" the suggestion that there is anything incongruous about his relationship with Hizbollah. He says his discussions with the group prompted it to tone down rhetoric about liberating Palestine and limit its demands to the release of Lebanese prisoners in Israel and an end to Israeli occupation of the disputed Shebaa Farms area. His accord with Hizbollah, which has resisted U.N. demands for its disarmament, calls for the issue to be solved in the context of a national defence strategy for Lebanon. "Since we don't have force to solve the problem, we have to develop trust and then to have an honest broker to build confidence between Hizbollah and (Saad) Hariri," Aoun said....With the war over, Aoun says the need for political change is urgent, though his critics say it would be disruptive. "We need to have a government really representative of the people, sharing power and decision-making," he declared. Reuters

More leaders in the States are beginning to speak out about the wrong direction the US is heading in: Top military leaders insist new U.S. strategy is desperately needed in Iraq...to Revive American diplomacy in the Middle East.

"Everything we are doing brings Iran and Syria closer together when we ought to be doing everything we can to split them apart," said the senior general. "We need a U.S. ambassador in Syria. (The Bush administration recalled the U.S. ambassador, who hasn't returned.) It would help in Iraq and have spin-off benefits in Lebanon. You can't exert influence if you are not there. We need to be talking to the Syrians. Hell, we need to be talking to the Iranians. This whole axis of evil thing is bull! All it did was drive our enemies closer together. "Wilkerson said the administration should "bring in the surrounding states, not just Iran, though it is the most important one, and get them to share the load moneywise and diplomatically. The Bedouins have got to stop putting their money on all sides, hoping that one will win. They must put their money exclusively on the government in Baghdad. They have to understand that the U.S. is not leaving until the situation is stable." Wilkerson said the United States also has to start a "rational dialogue" with Iran that encompasses everything from the MEK guerrillas to al-Qaeda to nuclear weapons to Hezbollah, Iraq and the Persian Gulf. He said the administration also should start negotiations to settle, once and for all, the Israel-Palestinian situation, including talks with Syria on the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, with Lebanon and with the Palestinians themselves. "The U.S. must be an honest broker in all of these talks — not Israel's lawyer," Wilkerson said. "The U.S. must be willing to bang heads, all of them if necessary." Finally, Wilkerson argued that the United States must ask international institutions such as the United Nations to help. "You have to cajole and wheedle and coerce your allies to do likewise. If this means eating a little crow, you just ask for the pepper and the cayenne," he said. Joseph L. Galloway

Syria wants peace on basis of relevant UN resolutions -- official DAMASCUS, Sept 10

(KUNA) -- Syria expressed hope that the US administration and other western nations would acknowledge the keenness of Arab countries, including itself, to achieve comprehensive and just peace in the Middle East. Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad said in statements published Sunday in Al-Thawra newspaper that his country hopes that America's efforts would head in the right direction and would reach practical solutions for the conflicts that face the people of the Middle East. Mekdad said "the recent victory in Lebanon encourages us to be optimistic...we cannot remain silent about losing rights...and the occupation of our lands." Syria wants comprehensive peace in the region based on the UN Security Council's resolutions 242, 338 and 497 which was issued 1981 regarding the occupation of the Golan heights and which declares Israel annexation of the heights as illegal. Syria wants peace according to the land-for-peace accord reached during the Arab-Israeli peace conference, held in Madrid in the early 90s, as well as the Arab peace initiative that genuinely calls for establishment of an independent Palestinian state. On the investigative committee of the assassination of former Lebanese premier Rafic Al-Hariri, he said those who planned the plot aimed at destroying the special relationship between Syria and Lebanon and at creating instability in the region, he added. He expressed Syria's keenness on cooperating with the investigative committee in order to show that Israel was the one to benefit from assassinating Al-Hariri. On terrorism, he said, Syria condemns and combats international terrorism and it differentiates between terrorism and people who fight for their rights and freedom. KUNA

جنرال امريكي: لا دليل على ان ايران تدعم متشددين في شمال العراق An American General announces that their is no evidence that Iran is supporting extremists in the North of Iraq. The Wall Street Journal writes that Bush was behind the Khatami visit. Is he looking for a way to climb down? WSJ: Bush personally signed off on Khatami visit to U.S. By Reuters 10/09/2006

U.S. President George W. Bush personally signed off on a visa allowing former Iranian president Mohammed Khatami to visit the United States because he wanted to hear his views, the Wall Street Journal reported on Saturday. Khatami, Iran's president from 1997 to 2005, is the most prominent Iranian in decades to visit the United States, outside of the United Nations' New York headquarters. His five-city speaking tour is controversial given U.S. accusations that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, sponsors terrorism and arms Hezbollah guerrillas in Lebanon. "I was interested to hear what he had to say," Bush told the Wall Street Journal in an interview. "I'm interested in learning more about the Iranian government, how they think, what people think within the government."

The INDEPENDENT, 10 September 2006, explains that:

The "war on terror" - and by terrorists - has directly killed a minimum of 62,006 people, created 4.5 million refugees and cost the US more than the sum needed to pay off the debts of every poor nation on earth. If estimates of other, unquantified, deaths - of insurgents, the Iraq military during the 2003 invasion, those not recorded individually by Western media, and those dying from wounds - are included, then the toll could reach as high as 180,000.

"Hizbullah in the Eyes of Syrians during the War," by Hassan Hassan and Abdullah Taa`i

Hizbullah in the Eyes of Syrians during the War Hassan Hassan and Abdullah Taa’i Written for Syria Comment Sept. 6, 2006 No sooner had the flags in support of the Brazilian World Cup team begun to be taken down than did Hizbullah flags start going up in streets of Damascus. The colour did not change, I hasten to add. Every car had the yellow flag and the picture of Hassan Nasrullah. Smokers carried lighters with the photo of the ‘Leader of the Resistance’. Everybody was talking cheerfully about Sheikh Nasrullah. People in front of the TV often reiterated “Verily, the party of God is the victorious’’ (A Quranic verse). The Syrian people were acting and talking as if Hizbullah were the military wing of Syria. Astonishingly enough, there was complete harmony between the Syrian government and the people when it came to their attitude towards the war. This harmony was not enforced by the Syrian media this time. The war seemed to unite the two which is something other means could not do for a long time. Even some liberal youth and critics of the government started to say: “Let the government do whatever it likes as long as it supports our national cause. We are willing to die of hunger rather than die with humiliation.” Cutting off electricity for a long period of time and using private establishments were most welcome on the Syrian people’s part. You could find the influence of the war on every detail of the Syrian life: take the bus, go to hospitals, visit any public centre, talk to anybody in the street and you would be flabbergasted at how Hizbullah is idolized. The way the Syrian people were enthusiastic about the war was even more extreme than that of the government. I admit that I was taken aback by this. The vast majority of people believed that Israel would have invaded Lebanon even had Hizbullah not taken Israelis hostage or carried it its provocative cross border raid. All believed that Israel would lose is an article of faith and just a matter of time. More astonishingly, people were fired up with the idea that Syria should get involved in the war and that they should follow the example of the Lebanese resistance in Syria, particularly in the Golan Heights. The Syrian people, however, had a gut feeling that nothing of that sort would happen, perhaps thanks to the long silence on the Syrian front. Let us elaborate and talk about the Shi`i-Sunni relationship during the war, and maybe after. Perhaps because Hizbullah tends to address the whole Muslim community, the vast majority of Sunni Muslims wholeheartedly supported them. I hardly met a Sunni who didn’t support the party. Those Sunnis who were not supporting it were those who are strongly adherent, and usually fanatic, in their Sunni Islam. Shiites, on the other hand, seemed to be ecstatic with their new-found fame. The war feed their egos. They started to swagger with the idea of ‘I belong to this doctrine’. As a whole, the Syrian people started to see Israel as a weaker version of its former self. Previously Israel seemed to have had an all-encompassing power that could challenge all external influence; it seems that Hizbullah has revealed a tender under belly. "In this mishmash of appeasement and retreat, Syrian people rapidly lost their fears and came to see Israel as a paper tiger”, as Dr. Daniel Pipes put it, and “weaker than a spider's web.", as Hassan Nasrallah put it. During the war, it was the first time that a great number of people in Syria spoke in bad terms about Saudi Arabia and in good terms about Iran and the government. The position that Saudi Arabia adopted during the war surprised many Syrians. Many people now believe that the war was very revealing about Saudi Arabia’s and Egypt’s real position. The leading Sunni countries were against Hizbullah and practically pro-Israel, while Iran and Syria (Shi`i states) were with Hizbullah, the only surviving power that stands against ‘the USA-supported enemy’. This war, seemingly, has discredited Saudi Arabia quite a lot. In reality, the only thing that has deprived Sunni Muslims of sleep is Iran. They want to be with Hizbullah but they are afraid that that would only make Iran stronger and stronger until it has the strength to devour them. They all believe that Iran has a certain agenda for Sunnis. They cite examples of Shi`itization of certain areas of Syria. Al-Jazira - the East and North East of Syria - has witnessed Iranian activities to convert Sunnis to Shiism. Those sorts of activities infuriate Sunnis. During the World Cup, everyone in Syria was obsessed with his or her team and acted as if he or she were a footballer, but when the final match ended, people came back to their normal lives. Likewise, with the Lebanon War, every Syrian became obsessed with it, but when it ended, they returned to their normal lives. There are parts of Syria, however, that are still bearing the burden of the war. A distant and God-forsaken place, such as Abu Kamal, more vulnerable to the cynical abuse of power than other districts of Syria, cannot restrain the authorities from taxing its poor inhabitants. Every bus in Abu Kamal must pay 3 USD, every employee 2 USD, every family or extended family must pay 140 USD, in order to support ‘the resistance’ – that is not to mention those who must process government paperwork in a governmental centre; they must pay 2 USD to boot. Why are other areas not asked to carry the burden of the resistance? Do high authorities know this? Being but a humble Syria, I am not the best to answer this question. While all the rest of Syria is coming back home, the poor people of Abu Kamal must foot the bill. Syrian Shi`is are taking pride in their Sheikh – and why not? But the people of Abu Kamal, who are Sunnis to the man, are the ones who pay the price. The question now, though, is: Is this money - which is estimated to be hundreds of thousands of dollars - going to go to the hands of Hizbullah …? Written by Hassan Hassan and Abdullah Taa’i Addendum by Joshua Landis I just got off the phone with Druze friends, who have recently returned to Canada after having spent the summer in Suwayda' in the Jabal Druze. I asked them about the war and how it was perceived in Suwayda'. Ghada told me that it was quite extraordinary to be home during the war. “Every one was rooting for Hizbullah and the Lebanese,” she said. “We were so happy to see that there were some Arabs who were smart enough and technologically and strategically advanced enough to give the Israelis what they deserve and what they have been dishing out to us for so long.” But then she explained that every household in Suwayda’, including hers, had filled up with cousins and relatives from Lebanon, who had fled the Shouf. They were not happy. They supported Junblat and complained that they would lose their jobs and livings and that they would have to eat ka`ak and tea. I asked her if the Druze were taxed as people were in Abu Kamal. She responded in some consternation, “Tax? I thought it was a donation. My family donated and everyone from our neighbourhood did as well. I don’t know if it was a tax. Maybe it was. I will have to ask my husband.” She said that the one perplexing event was the mass demonstration organized by the state. Schools and work were stopped for a day and everyone was called out onto the streets for a large demonstration. The speakers were sounding with silly slogans and other things that no one believes in. “That was humiliating and disturbing,” she said. “The young people seemed to enjoy it and entered into the spirit of the occasion, but for the older people, who know better, it was just humiliating. Up to that point everyone had handled themselves with such dignity." But she added, “that is the Syria I belong to.” She ended by explaining how scary and sad it was too. She explained, "In the beginning many men in the reserves were called up for duty, when the government feared that the war might expand, but in the end they were sent home. The saddest part was during Kana, when we saw all the pictures and TV coverage of the children who were needlessly killed.” Ghada explained how she had been at neighbours with eight or nine other people watching and there was not a dry eye in the house. Everyone was weeping. It was so horrible. Those are the poor people who paid the price. I kept on trying to turn off the TV, but all the men wanted it on all day."

Syria Fights for Control of Palestine File

Reinoud Leenders, who was International Crisis Group's man in Lebanon for many years, has written up his opinion of the Lebanon War and how it will effect Hizbullah, "MIT's Electronic Journal for Middle East Studies soon. Syria is doing everything to show that there will be no progress on the Palestine front without engagement. It is obstructing Egyptian efforts to take back the Palestine portfolio as this article makes clear. No Egyptian mediation between Syria and Saudi Arabia (from mideastwire.com)

Elaph, a pan Arab website, reported in the September 6 issue about the latest developments in the diplomatic row between Saudi Arabia and Syria. The website wrote: “Diplomatic sources in Damascus denied to Elaph the existence of any Egyptian mediation between Syria and Saudi Arabia with the charged atmosphere between the two countries and the media campaigns launched by Syria in the last two days through websites. But the sources considered that it is ‘natural in case there is any dispute and in case the crisis escalated that one of the Arab sides might interfere to calm things down’. The sources considered that ‘Qatar is not qualified to play this role because it doesn’t have good relations with Saudi Arabia while Jordan is not on good terms with Syria so the only candidate for the job is Egypt’.” The website added: “The sources confirmed that ‘Egypt had already mediated between Syria and Turkey before and Syria and the United States as well as other western countries’. The sources pointed to the unlimited support presented by the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak to the young Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad and stressed that it is not hidden from those close to Mubarak that the Egyptian president wants to repeat the successful Syrian experiment in Egypt as he wishes to surrender his position as president to his son Jamal even though he has denied it repeatedly’. In answer to a question about the collapse of the Saudi-Egypt-Syria axis, the sources announced ‘The Saudi-Egypt-Syria axis is frozen now as a result of the dispute, but that doesn’t mean that it collapsed’. They added ‘when things get better and if Syria emerges ‘intact’ from the investigation into the assassination of the ex Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, the three countries will reactivate it’.” The website continued: “The sources stressed that the latest speech by president Al-Assad caused a deterioration in the Syrian relations with the Arabs and that if not for the speech then relations would have returned to normal with Damascus with the end of the Israeli aggression on Lebanon which stalked up the differences in the last period…” - Elaph, United Kingdom

Syria is also backing up Khalid Mishaal, the Hamas leader living in Damascus, in his efforts to keep Haniyya, the Hamas PM in Palestine, from concluding a deal with Israel without Syrian participation, as this article explains: Syria disrupting Shalit negotiations By KHALED ABU TOAMEH, Ramallah At the same time, Syria is insisting to Annan that if it is engaged, it is willing to help as Ibrahim al-Hamidi explains in this al-Hayat article: Damascus: total commitment to what Annan heard from Al-Asad...

On September 5, the daily Al Hayat reported: "High-level Syrian sources told Al-Hayat yesterday that Damascus "is totally committed" to what President Bashar al-Asad told UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on Friday and that "tangible steps" would be taken in the coming few days "to translate this on the ground". Annan had announced that President Al-Asad informed him that Syria would take "as soon as possible measures to control the borders" with Lebanon that include increasing the number of, and training, the border guards and increasing the road blocks with the possibility of forming joint patrols with the Lebanese army. Remarks by some Syrian officials after Annan's announcement raised some questions about the extent of Damascus' compliance with these "promises". Al Hayat learned yesterday that Syria "during the past two days held contacts with international parties and foreigners to confirm the commitment to what was agreed upon". "The sources asserted that "Syria has not backed down and is committed to what President Al-Asad told Annan" and pointed out that the coming days would see "measures to tighten the border control and stop the smuggling". Asked about Information Minister Dr Muhsin Bilal's statement to Al-Hayat last Friday that his country "will not agree to the demarcation of occupied territories", the sources answered that Damascus "did not promise the UN secretary-general to approve the demarcation of the Shab'a Farms so as to say that it has backed down on this. Annan heard the same words." But they pointed out that Syria "is open to establishing diplomatic relations with Lebanon in accordance with a sovereign decision by the two countries" and that it "is ready" to receive Prime Minister Fu'ad al-Sanyurah in accordance with the "official invitation" that Qatari Emir Shaykh Hamad Bin-Khalifah conveyed to him. Al Hayat, United Kingdom

Most Lebanese hail Hezbollah chief for war conduct (AFP) 7 September 2006

BEIRUT - A majority of Lebanese believe their country and Hezbollah won the month-long war with Israel and applauded the militant group’s chief Hassan Nasrallah, a poll published on Thursday suggested. The poll in the English-language Daily Star newspaper said 78.7 percent of respondents thought Nasrallah had demonstrated a good or excellent performance during the war, launched by Israel after Hezbollah staged a cross-border raid and captured two Israeli soldiers on July 12. The poll showed that 57 percent approved of Hezbollah’s action in snatching the soldiers while 34 percent were against it. Fifty-nine percent of those questioned said Hezbollah and Lebanon won the war, with some 30 percent saying no one had. Israel’s stated goals in its offensive were to recover the two captured soldiers and to drive Hezbollah and its weapons out of southern Lebanon. The soldiers are still being held, and the question of Hezbollah’s weapons has not been resolved. Among politicians’ approval ratings, Nasrallah was followed by parliament speaker Nabih Berri at 71.2 percent and Christian former general Michel Aoun at 58.1 percent. Prime Minister Fuad Siniora came in fourth with only 49.1 percent. The poll, which surveyed 27,800 Lebanese in August, also said a majority of the people were determined to stay in the country despite the further blow to the economy dealt by Israel’s offensive. A total of 58.9 percent of respondents said they planned to stay in Lebanon, while 15.3 percent said they intended to leave and 21.5 percent were waiting to see if the situation settles after the August 14 UN-brokered ceasefire. Lebanon has a population of around four million.

Hariri Trial: Lebanese law makers seem anxious not to give up control over the Hariri trials to an international body. Although Lebanese Justice Minister Charles Rizk says there is consensus for an international court to be set up to decide on who killed Hariri, he insists it be put to a vote in the Lebanese parliament. This means trouble. Lebanon seeks clarification of UN Hariri tribunal plan (AFP) 7 September 2006

BEIRUT - Lebanese Justice Minister Charles Rizk said on Thursday a UN proposal to set up an international court to try suspects in the 2005 murder of former premier Rafiq Hariri needed clarification. Rizk was speaking after a meeting with the UN under secretary general for legal affairs, Nicolas Michel, who was in Beirut to present an outline of the plan, first suggested by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in March. “We received the proposal, and it needs clarification before the final version” is adopted, the minister told journalists, without elaborating. Rizk said the idea was for the tribunal to be composed of two chambers. The first, a trial court, would have a panel of three judges, one of which would be Lebanese. The second, an appeals court, would have five judges, including two Lebanese. He also said there was a “national consensus” over forming the tribunal. “This is a working visit. (Michel) will inform us about the procedures to be followed, then I will present a proposal to the government and a decision will be taken. That will be submitted to parliament for a vote.”

Michel Chossudovsky believes preparations are being made for "World War Three." In his article, The Next Phase of the Middle East War 09/05/06 "GlobalResearch" he argues that "Israel's war on Lebanon is an integral part of a US sponsored "military roadmap". Issa Touma, the inveterate regime wrestler and brave Syrian artist is being hassled by the Baathist authorities in Aleppo yet again. W.J.T. Mitchell writes about Issa's latest run in: The Continuing Saga of Government Interference with the Arts in Syria

Robert Kaplan - Why He is Wrong about Syria

SHELDON KIRSHNER in his "War may bring Israel to talks with Syria"has written one of the best arguments for why Israel should reverse its policy toward Syria and sit down at the negotiating table. It has a lot to gain. Syria has a lot to offer. Syria also has a lot to gain and there is every reason to believe it is serious. Even Abdel Halim Khaddam, the ex-vice President who is not fighting against Asad, maintains that Syria was serious about peace in the 1990s. President Bashar has made it clear in every major speech that Peace remains Syria's strategic first choice. He quotes Sharon's famous last remark about the Golan - "in November 2005, Sharon ruled out engagement with Syria categorically, saying that he wished to retain the Golan: “I will not negotiate with Syria because I will never leave that area.” Sharon backed up his rejection with two arguments. One, Sharon chose to ignore Syria because it is "too weak" to sign an agreement. Has the Lebanon War changed that calculation? Two, Sharon, in common with his predecessors, argued that the Golan is absolutely vital for Israel’s security. "But Israel’s former chief of staff, Gen. Moshe Yaalon, a hawk who may soon join the ranks of Likud, has said that Israel could defend itself without maintaining a grip on the Golan." What is more, Israel's vulnerability does not come from the Golan, but from Hizbullah and Hamas. If Israel can attenuate that vulnerability by returning the Golan, is it worth it? Shaul Arieli in his Threatening Syria comes with price: Military threats come at expense of socioeconomic pledges," reminds Israeli politicians that opinion polls show that Israelis want guns over butter. By going to war against Syria, the government would have to scupper social programs that Israelis say are more important to them than increasing the defense budget. These arguments for engaging Syria do not convince either Shmuel Rosner or Robert Kaplan. I will comment following the article. Here is Rosner: How Syria Survives Bashar Assad may be stupid, but he has a very smart survival strategy. By Shmuel Rosner in Slate Posted Tuesday, Sept. 5, 2006, at 1:27 PM ET

It was mid-1957 when President Dwight Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles started to worry seriously about the fate of Syria. "There is evidence in Syria of the development of a dangerous and classic pattern," Dulles wrote. Soviet aid was rolling in, and Washington got nervous about what would follow: "The country will fall under the control of international Communism and become a Soviet satellite." A lot has changed since those days. The Assad family came to power in Syria, the Soviet Union no longer exists, and the domino theory no longer applies. But some striking similarities still pertain: Syria is a weak player in a tough neighborhood, making itself visible by aligning itself with troubling trends. Now it's the Iranians helping them, it's Lebanon and Iraq they are destabilizing (and not Jordan, as was frequently the case in the past), and its Islamist terrorism and not Communism that makes the United States worried and angry. The headache is similar, as is the failure to find the right remedy. "By most indicators of strategic importance … Syria would seem destined to be no more than a minor player, relatively easy for greater powers … to marginalize and ignore," writes Flynt Leverett of the New America Foundation in his new book, Inheriting Syria. Nevertheless, Syrians have been able to show, again and again, that taking them lightly is a big mistake. The disruptive power they apply—by supporting terrorists in Palestine and Iraq, by trying to sabotage any attempt to achieve peace between Israel and the Arab world, by defying U.N. resolutions, by meddling in Lebanon's affairs—is something U.S. administrations, including the current one, have been unable to overcome. For the United States, Syria is a constant reminder of the limitations of a superpower. President Bashar Assad, ridiculed by many as an imbecile—in Washington three weeks ago, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres called him "the son of a clever man"—is a constant reminder of an even more troubling phenomenon: You can be a "stupid" leader and survive. That is, if you believe Assad really is stupid. The evidence is not as overwhelming as you might think. Assad was patient enough to make the U.N. inquiry into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri a waste of time; Syria was found guilty but didn't pay a price. He was smart enough to support Hezbollah in Lebanon, defying threats by the international community, and was able to claim victory when the outcome of the Israeli-Hezbollah war was, even by favorable accounts, uncertain. Like an acrobat on a tightrope, Assad meticulously walks the fine line between two losing strategies: He is not enough of a nuisance to make it necessary to deal with him urgently (Iran, the much stronger country in his camp, and the Syrian circus' safety net, plays that role), but not quiet enough to make himself negligible and marginalized. Assad is a fine acrobat—a joy to watch—as long as he doesn't fall. And he understands the ways of the tumbler, knows that the only way for him to stay above the rest of the crowd is to keep moving in the same direction. One stop, even a minor hesitation, will be the end of his journey. In the West, many think he is dumb, because he doesn't do what the international community wants him to do. But Assad has other bosses: He looks up to Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's leader, and to the rulers of Iran. If he positions himself between these two, he is safer. The world has tried—is still trying—to defeat Hezbollah in Lebanon. And it is also struggling to deal with the mullahs in Tehran, with zero success so far. Syria is always the country we can deal with "later" or "after" the one we are really busy with. In a January 2002 piece in the National Journal, Jonathan Rauch reported, "When I asked how high Syria would be on the Bush Administration's post-Afghanistan … agenda, [the official] replied that the Administration is still sorting out its priorities, but that Syria 'is going to be on the list, and it's not going to be at the bottom.' " Right after U.S. troops entered Baghdad in 2003, Time magazine reported, "A group of the President's top foreign-policy advisers … gathered in the White House to discuss the road ahead. Only half the meeting was devoted to developments in Iraq. The rest of the session was spent debating how to tackle a fresh target: Syria." In the July 2003 London Review of Books, Charles Glass asked, "Is Syria Next?"—a headline so tired it shouldn't even be sold in a used-book store. But there it was, popping up again in 2004, when Timothy Garton Ash asks "Next Stop Syria?" in Britain's Guardian. Fast-forward to 2006, and Israel has decided to target Hezbollah rather than the Assad regime. Meddling behind the scenes wasn't provocative enough to justify a frontal attack, Jerusalem calculated. Some think it was the wrong decision. At the Pentagon, senior officials insisted on asking why Israel didn't take the opportunity to deal, once and for all, with Damascus. They asked, but the answer never came, and the moment has passed. So, now, again, Syria is next in line. But first come: dealing with Iran's nuclear weapons, stabilizing Lebanon, the massacres in Darfur, the insurgency in Iraq, the opium crops in Afghanistan, and the midterm elections. If Assad keeps moving along his tightrope, he might prove that the next station is the one that never comes.

Rosner makes two arguments here. One is that smart Americans going back to Secretary of State Dulles have recognized that Syria is the problem. It should be at the top of US foreign policy concerns. Two, is that Bashar al-Asad is really dumb. He only seems smart because his cowardice had allowed him to hide behind Iran, Hizbullah and others, thus allowing him to dupe the smart Americans. In short, America should start with regime change in Syria; it would be easy. Of course Rosner conveniently forgets to explain that "smart" Dulles tried regime change in Damascus by organizing a coup in 1957. What was the result? He failed. Rather than bringing Syria into America's orbit, he pushed it into the arms of Nasser and Russia, which ultimately led to the Baathist take-over. Dulles, who Rosner uses as his example of a smart American, was actually stupid and mistaken about America's ability to change the regime in Syria. Syria's most pro-American and able politicians, who were implicated in the failed coup effort, were jailed or discredited. It was a fiasco and still colors Syrian attitudes toward the US. Robert Kaplan, like Rosner, believes that the US should do some major surgery on Syria and is a proud neoconservative. Unlike Rosner, Kaplan is able to use history to good effect to present a sweeping understanding of the region. Just because he is smart, however, doesn't mean he is right. Here is his article - comments to follow. Setting History in Motion By Robert D. Kaplan 6 September 2006 The Wall Street Journal Europe

No leader since Napoleon has roiled the Middle East as has George W. Bush. By invading Iraq, President Bush set history in motion. By doing so without a strategy for governing it afterwards, he did not plan for the worst, and so the worst has happened. Iraq has become the pivot for strengthening the radical forces that the invasion should have weakened. Yet to assume history follows a straight path is fatalism; not analysis. A strengthened Shiite world was not an unintended consequence of the Iraq war. Toppling a Sunni dictator in predominantly Shiite Mesopotamia had to do that, whether the invasion resulted in stable democracy, benign dictatorship or chaos. People forget that moving history forward after 9/11 required shaking up the suffocating complacency of the Sunni Arab police states from where the terrorists originated. Back then, Iran seemed to offer an opportunity for regional change. It was among the Muslim world's most sophisticated populations, a significant portion of which was pro-American, embarrassed by their own regime. In late 2001, when the seemingly reformist president, Mohammed Khatami, was in power, a gradual political shift in Teheran without military action seemed possible, particularly if somewhat stable, somewhat pro-American governments emerged on Iran's borders in Iraq and Afghanistan. But ideas, particularly bold ones, are hostage to the quality of their execution. There was indeed a political shift in Iran -- for the worse. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president of the Islamic Republic in June 2005, in the wake of the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, the withdrawal of Syrian troops from that country, and historic elections that saw millions of Iraqis hold up the purple finger against tyranny. In the dynamic environment that Mr. Bush had unleashed, even a flawed occupation led to encouraging developments -- however superficial -- to which Iran's radicals reacted. Iran's advantages were these: Though Iraqis had voted, they had no governing authority worth the name; likewise, the Syrian troop withdrawal from Lebanon could not erase the fact of Lebanon's demographically ascendant and militarized Shiite community. Statements by the Arab League and the governments of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia initially blaming the violence in Lebanon on Hezbollah, rather than on Israel, stood as evidence that a heightened fear of Shiism had indeed shaken these states out of their complacency. Arab support proved short-lived, though, because of Israel's dragged-out and bungled operation. But while Iran is strengthened, it is not dominant: The radical Islamic universalism that it once sought to represent has been narrowed to sectarianism with no appeal beyond its own Shiite community. Iran plays the spoiler in Iraq. But Iranian politics will become gnarled by its interaction with a more pluralistic, ethnically Arab, Shiite southern Iraq. Americans are tearing their hair out over Iraq. The Iranians will be too, if there is a full-scale civil war. What if Iran's former diplomatist president, Hashemi Rafsanjani, had won the election against Mr. Ahmadinejad? Iran's nuclear program, which Mr. Rafsanjani did so much to develop, would be quietly chugging along, without the need for chest-thumping theater or threats to annihilate Israel; so would be the continued Iranian arming of Hezbollah, without the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers. Because Mr. Rafsanjani would be whispering sweet-nothings into the ears of America's European allies, Iranian power would be in full ascendance, with only the U.S. and Israel complaining. But a strengthened Iran, ruled by a hothead, has frightened the Sunni world out of its lethargy, making it realize, potentially, the usefulness of the U.S. in adjusting the balance of power against a threat greater than Israel. Meanwhile, this hothead, having aroused both Sunni Arab and European states against him to a degree unprecedented in Iran's post-revolutionary history, has fostered certain unease at home. Here I pause to recollect the cost of the Cold War's end. Full-scale civil wars erupted in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The breakup of Yugoslavia led to 200,000 deaths and a million refugees. Sectarian violence in the southern region of the former Soviet Union resulted in an additional 150,000 dead and 1.5 million refugees, with rivers of blood in Georgia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. In Tajikistan alone, 50,000 people died violently. Russia teetered on the edge of chaos. Its soaring crime rate -- the result of Mikhail Gorbachev's liberalization and the crumbling of the Soviet police state -- resulted in 100,000 additional murders, when the murder rates of the 1980s are subtracted from later ones. Applying the same formula to South Africa suggests perhaps over 100,000 extra murders and a larger number of extra rapes as the price of dismantling the apartheid system. As for the cost of invading Iraq, the sanctions regime before the war killed at least 500,000 malnourished Iraqi children. There were, too, the deaths from Saddam's desultory bureaucracy of repression and torture. Of course, the decision to dismantle government authority in Iraq put the Bush administration under the obligation to engage in intensive planning for the post-invasion phase -- with the emphasis on worst-case scenarios. But worst-case scenarios were considered only for the invasion itself. The problem with Ahmed Chalabi was not that we supported this secular, pro-American Shiite -- no sleazier than any other politician who has since emerged in Baghdad -- but that the U.S. trusted his opinions about how Americans would be greeted in Iraq, and what they would find (or not find) there. That was irresponsible not because Mr. Chalabi turned out to be wrong, but because he was optimistic. Military planning should never depend on optimism. To assume things in Iraq had to turn out as they did, no matter the strategy or degree of planning, is fatalism. But that doesn't mean local conditions don't exert an influence on outcomes. Europe's recent past should warn the U.S. about the Middle East: recall the violence that ensued when authoritarian regimes unraveled in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, where populations were divided on the basis of sect and ethnicity, and kept poor by a mafia state socialism. The states closest to Central Europe, blessed by the enlightened imperial legacy of the Prussian and Habsburg empires, have enjoyed a much easier transition to democratic rule than those under the rule of the Ottoman Turks. And while the Balkans constituted among the most advanced parts of the Turkish Empire, much of the Arab world, greater Syria and Mesopotamia especially, constituted its most backward region. The countries that lie between the Mediterranean Sea and Persia had little meaning before the 20th century. Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq were but vague geographical expressions. Jordan wasn't thought of. When we remove the official lines on the map, we find a crude finger-painting of Sunni and Shiite population clusters that contradict national borders. Inside these borders, the governing authorities in Lebanon and Iraq barely exist. The one in Syria is tyrannical but fundamentally unstable; the one in Jordan rational but under quiet siege. If there is a part of the Middle East that dimly approximates the former Yugoslavia it is the region from Lebanon to Iran. We face the unraveling of the state system that for a century was the solution to the demise of the Ottoman Empire. Take Syria, at once a Brezhnev-style dictatorship, a land of Web logs and Islamic revivalism, of on-again off-again clampdowns, with rapidly diminishing oil reserves, and with no real history as a state, unlike Egypt or Iran. Syria's future is problematic. The broad desert reaching between the Anti-Lebanon range and the Zagros Mountains, encompassing Damascus and Baghdad, Aleppo and Mosul, Homs and Fallujah, will be a semi-chaotic meeting ground of ideas and ideologies, liberalism and terrorism, commerce and crime, where Turks, Kurds, Persians, and Sunni and Shiite Arabs engage and affect each other as never before since the late 19th century. In this most backward realm of the Ottoman Empire, the transition away from the Cold War-era Arab police states will make that in Central Europe and the Balkans away from communism seem effortless by comparison. With its ethnic and sectarian divisions, any democracy in Syria will be a shambles. To wit, what the Lebanese, Palestinian and Iraqi governments all have in common is that they can't get anything done. But this democratic failure is happening alongside an authoritarian one. Iran appears strong, in part, because Sunni Arab dictatorships like Egypt and Saudi Arabia are in tired phases of transition. Given the leadership crisis in the Sunni world, imagine how Saddam Hussein might have dominated the Arab masses -- with rising oil prices, the $50 billion ongoing Oil for Food coverup, a leading-nowhere regimen of no-fly zones, and European and Chinese intrigues to restore his legitimacy in return for energy concessions. Saddam as the new Nasser is a plausible alternative history for Iraq. So instead of Saddam bestriding a vast and frenzied Sunni mob, we will see a string of messy, Mexico-style scenarios (the replacement of decisive one-party states with far more chaotic multi-party ones), but without Mexico's level of institutionalization that, as low as it is, remains ahead of most countries in the Middle East. To say that George Bush has been among the greatest agents of freedom in the region is a nebulous historical statement. It avoids the harder question: Did he go about it prudently? Given that good planning is the better part of valor in any decision-making process, the provisional answer is "no." Next year could see the beginning of a massive draw-down in Iraq, from 140,000 to 40,000-or-so troops: a number by which the military manpower strain becomes alleviated. An increase in troops above 140,000, coupled with the willingness to destroy Shiite militias, could dramatically improve the situation. But outside the universe of some policy journals there is no appetite for that. The political calculus is disturbingly inexorable: No more troops in Iraq now or ever, and the bulk out before the 2008 presidential season. Without immediate, demonstrable progress in Baghdad, the Republican Party will overtake the White House on this issue. U.S. Marines, special operations forces and air assets will remain in a few staging posts to strike at international terrorists, to balance against Iran and Syria, and to try to prevent all-out war between what is emerging as three institutionally separate parts of the country. Gen. George Casey's assertion that the Iraqi Army will be ready to stand up in 12 to 18 months disregards the fact that there are no reliable civilian institutions for it to represent. How these soldiers perform in the field is one thing; the social pressures they face quite another. Rather than democracy, the Bush administration may have to settle for mere governance of almost any sort. Think of late medieval maps, with no bold lines, only indistinct regions of Persian influence shading Kurdistan, Mesopotamia and elsewhere. The carnage caused by Mr. Bush's shattering of the post-Ottoman state system is minor compared to that in the former Soviet Union and its shadow zones after the Berlin Wall fell. Can he keep it that way? Can he undermine Iranian hegemony even as he reduces whatever control he has in Iraq? The president may need to pull closer to the Saudi royals, Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and Jordan's King Abdullah. Weakened by America's response to 9/11, terrified by Israeli incompetence in defending their interests in Lebanon, these regimes still demonstrate more enlightenment than their populations. They fear Iran more than do the Europeans. Whatever America's ultimate decisions in regards to a nuclearizing Iran, it requires all the help it can get. That is what comes of bold ideas, poorly executed. Mr. Kaplan is a national correspondent of the Atlantic Monthly and Class of 1960 distinguished visiting professor at the U.S. Naval Academy.

For over a decade, Kaplan has been hammering away at his comparison between the Balkans and the Greater Syria region. There are similarities - both were Ottoman lands, both encompass fragmented populations, divided by religion and ethnicity, both suffered dictatorial regimes. Because of these common traits, Kaplan then argues, they must share a common fate. Like the Balkans, the Levant states will know horrible civil war and be divided up and rearranged. Its future is the Balkans. He goes so far as to say that this is what Syrians secretly yearn for, even if they don't say it in so many words or don't even know it themselves. Here is an extract from a 2005 article of his in which he prophesizes that Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon will lead to the collapse of Syria's Alawite-led regime and division of the country. Nonstop Turbulence Rather than Iraq, it could be Syria that ends up collapsing. BY ROBERT D. KAPLAN Sunday, March 20, 2005; Wall Street Journal

Rather than Iraq, it could be Syria that ends up collapsing. Syria's pan-Arabism was a substitute for its weak identity as a state. Greater Syria was an Ottoman era geographical expression that included present-day Lebanon, Jordan and Israel-Palestine, to which the truncated borders of the current Syrian state do great violence. Ever since France sundered Lebanon from Syria in 1920, the Syrians have been desperate to get it back. The total Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon--that President Bush is demanding--will undermine the very political foundation of the minority Alawite regime of Bashar al-Assad, whose own ethnic group spills over into both countries and whose political survival depends on proving that he is a better Syrian nationalist than the majority Sunnis. Syria is but a Levantine version of the former Yugoslavia--without the intellectual class which that other post-Ottoman state could claim at the time of its break-up (since Hafez al-Assad's rule was so much more stultifying than Tito's). In Syria, as in the former Yugoslavia, each sect and religion has a specific geography. Aleppo in the north is a bazaar city with greater historical links to Mosul and Baghdad than to Damascus. Between Aleppo and Damascus is the increasingly Islamist Sunni heartland. Between Damascus and the Jordanian border are the Druze. Free and fair elections in 1947, 1949 and 1954 exacerbated these divisions by dividing the vote along sectarian lines. Hafez al-Assad came to power in 1970 after 21 changes of government in the previous 24 years. For three decades he was the Leonid Brezhnev of the Arab world, staving off the future while failing to build a national consciousness by virtue of a suffocating and calcifying tyranny. The question is: As President Bush humiliates Assad's son-and-successor into weakness, will Syria become a larger version of Civil War-era Lebanon?

We can go even farther back to 1993 and this article, in which he explains to us what Syrians yearn for: Syria: Identity Crisis The Atlantic Monthly February 1993

Hafez-al Assad has so far prevented the Balkanization of his country, but he can't last forever... Shishakli publicly lamented in 1953 that Syria was merely "the current official name for that country which lies within the artificial frontiers drawn up by imperialism." Unfortunately for him, he was right. Syria will not remain the same. It could become bigger or smaller, but the chance that any territorial solution will prove truly workable is slim indeed. Some Middle East specialists mutter about the possibility that a future Alawite state will be carved out of Syria. Based in mountainous Latakia, it would be a refuge for Alawites after Assad passes from the scene and Muslim fundamentalists -- Sunnis, that is -- take over the government. This state would be supported not only by Lebanese Maronites but also by the Israeli Secret Service, which would see no contradiction in aiding former members of Assad's regime against a Sunni Arab government in Damascus. Some Syrians, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, look forward to the collapse of both Israel and Jordan and their reintegration into Syria, as they waited in the 1940s for the incorporation into Syria of the autonomous states in Latakia and Jabal Druze. Should Assad's death lead to chaos in Damascus, it is not out of the question that the region of Jabal Druze would break away from Syria and amalgamate itself with Jordan. Because Lebanon's current stability rests upon Syrian military domination there, a weakening of government institutions in Syria could result in a renewal of the Lebanese civil war. What Syria deep down yearns for -- what would assuage its insoluble contradictions -- is to duplicate the process now under way in the Balkans. That is, it wishes to repeal the political results of the twentieth century -- in Syria's case, the border arrangements made by Great Britain and France after the First World War.

Kaplan is undoubtedly correct when he argues that most Syrians, throughout most of the last century, were unhappy with the way the French and British divided up the Ottoman lands. But that does not mean there is a better way to divide it up now or that the US would be well advised to try to turn the clock back 90 years in order to try its hand at redrawing the map of the region. Kaplan argues that American can do a better job than the French and British did back in 1918. I doubt it. His presumption and argument is that because we can see the future -- which is that there will be even great death and destruction in the Syrian lands than in the Balkans -- we should intervene now and short-circuit the process. Because the US is more clairvoyant and smarter than others, it can mitigate the death and destruction, which is inevitable, by fixing the problem sooner, rather than waiting for the big bang later. He is convinced that even with all America's bungling in Iraq, it has saved lives there compared to what "history" had in store for it. History for Kaplan is the Balkans. One obvious error in Kaplan's logic is that he insists that more developed regions (the Balkans) kill fewer people when they go to war over national issues than do poorer and less nationally developed regions (Syria or Iraq). The opposite would seem to be true. Europe, the most developed region of the world engaged in a 30 year war from 1914-1945, motivated by dreams of expanding national borders and rearranging the map. 50 million Europeans were killed. The Balkans in the 1990s, less developed than Europe, killed fewer than either Germany or France. Why shouldn't Syria be able to sort out its national problems with even fewer deaths yet. It's backwardness is advantageous. Not only have Syrians had more incapable armies because of their poverty, but their loyalties when national borders were drawn were largely limited to clan, village and sect. Building national consciousness and solidarity is not easy in any context. Being poor and less literate does not make one more likely to kill. The lesson of this is that we don't know what history intends. We don't know what Syrians yearn for. We don't know if America would do better than France. We cannot use historical analogies with confidence. We are almost always wrong when we do. Kaplan, who got his training serving in the Israeli army, is right to council pessimism when trying to intervene in the Middle East, but he is too optimistic in believing that the Israeli model will work for the rest of the Middle East. Like a number of Israeli neocons, Kaplan presumes that because Jews have successfully used their religious bonds to confirm their ethnic and national identity, so should Alawites, Shiites, Maronites, Druze and the other religious groups among Arabs. Many Alawites and Druze did dream of having their own state during the first half of the 20th century, but they have largely given up on this dream and substituted another – which is to be happily integrated into Syrian society. Neither sect wants to return to its traditional mountain villages. Sunnis also dream of a properly integrated society and have always refused to accept dividing the mountain regions from the Sunni heartland. They did not like the other regions of Greater Syria being separated from French Syria, but, by and large, they have learnt that instant unity schemes will not work and that romantic nationalism has been costly. Pan Syrian, Arab, and Islamic dreaming is not dead, but most Syrians know that such reverie will remain frustrated until some EU type unity can be built on the back of international law and deals struck by sovereign and secure Arab states. Religion remains the big barrier to national integration. But redrawing Arab borders based on religion would create more problems than it would solve and destroy more lives than it would uplift. Giving into religious prejudice for the sake of exploiting the loyalties religion can provide is not the solution to Middle Eastern problems. The best path forward for the United States is not to presume that it can redraw the map of the Middle East, but to insist that internationally recognized borders are preserved and respected. It should not compound the mistakes of the French and British by making even more mistakes; rather, it should remain committed to seeing through the success of the borders that were agreed upon by the League of Nations and confirmed by the UN. There were no “correct” borders in 1918 or 1922. A century of history has given some legitimacy to the necessarily artificial borders and propagated hundreds of national institutions that are defined by them. To erase all this in a fit of arrogance would be foolish. Addendum: EHSANI2 said... (Wednesday, September 06, 2006)

Growing up in Syria, the country’s education system had drilled into our heads that the Sykes-picot agreement was an absolute disaster for our nation and region. I could not help but notice how the conclusion of your article differs from the country’s education curriculum. I always thought that changing the curriculum is long due for a major overhaul anyway. Perhaps the education ministry and the Baath higher ups can use your line of thinking as a starting point.

Joshua Landis said... (Wednesday, September 06, 2006)

Ehsani, Baathist schoolbooks have changed little since they were first codified in the mid 1960s at the acme of Pan-Arab dreams. They still sing the Arabist romantic nationalism line, alas. I believe that most Arabs - even Syrian Arabs - have largely rewritten those books in their own minds. Some have substituted Pan-Islamism for Pan-Arabism, but even the Muslim Brotherhood has agreed to allow each regional branch to pursue its unique regional methods and policies, giving a bow to local national realities. The official Baathist mind has changed even if the textbooks have not. This last year at the height of the Mehlis report anxiety, Foreign Minister Mu`alim and two other senior Syrian officials held a round table covered by al-Hayat during which they decried the prospect of a second Sykes-Picot treaty for Syria, following the lines of the US division of Iraq. The subtext was that Syria didn't like the original Sykes-Picot treaty, but that today, all it wants is to hang on to the national borders it has. Kaplan is right when he argues that the invasion of Iraq has caused a major shift in consciousness among Arabs. The shift is not the one that Kaplan thinks it is however. It is to make Arabs appreciate the borders they have and to fear rash adventurism. This is one of the reasons that Bashar al-Asad is eager to sign a peace agreement with Israel and to get Syria's borders nailed down for good. Bashar has been nailing down Syria's borders one after the other. He jettisoned Syria's claims to Antochia in order to patch up relations with Turkey. He handed back the thin sliver of Jordanian land snatched in 1970 in order to gain Jordanian support. He pulled out of Lebanon in order to preserve stability in Syria. He built a wall along the Iraqi border in order to seal its troubles off from Syria. Now he is casting about for peace with Israel. Syrians have not complained about this border clarifying because they understand that it is better for them. They are tired of adventures and have given up on getting back lost land. The Golan seems to be the one region they care about. This all promotes some hope that Syrian borders are becoming real and may lead to an eventual consolidation of Syrian national consciousness. Maybe the textbooks are out-dated?