The Jamestown Foundation has just issued their
Special Issue on Syria of "Terroism Monitor," an on-line publication. The Jamestown Foundation is the best known independent institute monitoring terrorist organizations.
I am copying the links to their four interesting articles on Syria. I have copied two of the articles in full. One by Sami Moubayed and the other an interview with the British based leader of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood Ali Bayanouni. All the articles are informative.
Here is the newsletter email.
Published by The Jamestown Foundation"Terroism Monitor"
August 11, 2005 – Volume III, Issue 16
Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and the Third Generation of Salafi-Jihadists By
Murad Al-ShishaniSyria: A Haven for Terrorists? By
Sherifa ZuhurThe History of Political and Militant Islam in Syria By
Sami MoubayedThe Battle within Syria: An Interview with Muslim Brotherhood Leader Ali BayanouniVIEW PDF VERSIONEditor's Note:
Syria is an enigmatic country. Ruled by a Ba'athist regime whose top leadership is drawn from a minority religious sect, Syria must contend with the enmity of the West and Islamists alike. This special issue presents a variety of perspectives on this important and controversial country. The article on Mustafa Setmariam Nasar profiles the extraordinary exploits of this influential al-Qaeda leader. The second article explores official Syrian complicity in the transit of foreign fighters into Iraq, analyzing it in the context of Syria's deteriorating national security environment. An analyst and writer living in Syria raises the concerns over sudden political change by drawing a comparison to neighboring Iraq, where the destruction of the Ba'ath regime has led to the demise of secularism in that country. Finally, the interview with Ali Sadreddine Bayanouni, the leader of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and the most important Syrian opposition figure, gives an insight into the ambitions and limitations of Syrian Islamists.
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Abu Mus'ab al-Suri and the Third Generation of Salafi-JihadistsBy Murad Batal al-Shishani
The decimation of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in 1982 had many long-term implications, the most pernicious of which was the emergence of a particularly extreme form of Syrian Salafism. At the center of this is Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, better known as Abu Musab al-Suri (the Syrian), who is widely believed to be the most prolific al-Qaeda ideologue and trainer alive. Currently working closely with the Zarqawi network, and probably based in Iraq, Nasar also allegedly exercises operational control over several al-Qaeda linked networks in the West.
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Syria: A Haven for Terrorists?By Sherifa Zuhur
Are Syrian officials aiding the underground mujahideen railroad to Iraq? The many strong opinions on the matter reflect the different views of Syria's future, its relations with neighbors, Iraq and Lebanon, and to jihadist and moderate Islamism. Certainly, we need to look at the totality of Syrian affairs and not simply at isolated cases of questionable behavior. At present it appears the Syrians are more concerned about their decreasing control over a variety of actors in Lebanon than about the progress of mujahideen from Syria eastward. More broadly the Syrians are anxious to assert their cooperation in the global war on terrorism, despite Washington's freezing of certain ministerial and agent's assets, as if protests of innocence will sharpen Washington's aggressive image or prove that the Americans generate a lot of kalam fadi, or empty talk in Arabic.
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The History of Political and Militant Islam in SyriaBy Sami Moubayed
The rise of political Islam in Syria can be traced to the 1940s, when a Muslim group called al-Gharra entered parliament, creating an Islamic Bloc to oppose the secular and civilian regime of President Shukri al-Quwatli. In 1944, its leaders presented a long list of demands that included installing special tramcars during rush hour to separate the sexes, shutting down all cabarets and casinos that served alcohol, arresting the owners of nightclubs, and the establishment of a moral police squad, similar to the one in Saudi Arabia, to be charged with patrolling streets and punishing transgressors of Islamic norms. In May 1944, al-Gharra violently protested against a charity ball held in Damascus, which wives of the ruling elite were planning to attend unveiled. Demonstrators took to the streets, carrying revolvers and knives, stoning cinemas that welcomed women and burning nightclubs. To win, the president decided to discredit the clerics in districts where they enjoyed most power; the poor neighborhoods of Damascus.
Quwatli got Adila Bayhum, head of the independent Women's Union, to temporarily cease the free distribution of milk to the city's poor. When mothers came to collect, they were politely turned away and told, "go to the shaykhs, let them give you milk." [1] Then, Quwatli cut off flour distribution in Midan, where the Islamists were popular, knowing perfectly well that nobody else could provide bread since the government controlled all flour rations in the wartime economy. [2] The clerics could not deliver, and overnight the demonstrations supporting the Islamic groups turned against them. This civilized and effective approach is what Syria needs today in order to curb the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, or any other emerging Islamic group.
Consecutive regimes, especially after 1963, did not pursue moderate approaches, however, and clashed with the Brotherhood twice, in 1964 and 1982. The Brotherhood considered the Ba’ath to be secular heretics, and the Ba’athists considered the Brotherhood leaders to be dangerous fanatics who needed to be rooted out from Syrian society. The Muslim Brothers were disturbed by the Ba’athist takeover of 1963 and began to drum up anti-Ba’athist sentiment in Syria’s urban interior. Secret cells of Islamic groups were formed to bring down the Ba’athist regime. In Aleppo, for example, Sheikh Abd al-Rahman Abu Ghuddah, an ally of pre-Ba’athist Syrian President Nazim al-Qudsi and former Mufti of Aleppo, created the Movement for Islamic Liberation. [3] Inflammatory speeches aroused the street, and pulpits were used to denounce the Ba’athist regime. By April 1964, rioting had developed into a religious war in the conservative city of Hama, where arms were used against the government. The prime agitator was Marwan Hadeed, a Muslim leader from Hama who claimed that the Ba’athists, alongside all secular people, were infidels who must be put to the sword. He created a street militia of Islamic extremists to strike at anyone related to the regime, called al-Tali’a al-Muqatila (The Fighting Vanguard). [4] It became unsafe for Ba’athists to walk the streets of Hama unguarded, since those who were caught were beaten, and in some cases killed, by the Islamists. The most famous assassination was that of Munzir al-Shimali, a young member of the Ba’ath National Guard, who was killed and mutilated in Hama. [5] This enraged the Ba’athists and Defense Minister Hamad Ubayd ordered the Syrian Army into Hama, bombarding districts of the city where the Brotherhood were located. Street fighting ensued, and the insurgents took up residence at the Sultan Mosque which was air raided under orders from President Amin al-Hafez. [6] In all, around 70 members of the Brotherhood were killed. Defeated, they put down their arms and ceased their militant activity for the next 15-years, when they re-emerged in 1979 to challenge the regime of President Hafez al-Asad.
A combination of factors triggered the Brotherhood to re-activate in the mid-1970s. First, they had recovered, physically, morally, and financially, from the defeat of 1964. Second, their outrage was at its peek when Asad went to war in Lebanon in 1976, supporting the Christians against the Palestinian guerillas of Yasser Arafat. Third, mass recruitment into the Ba’ath Party made it easy to infiltrate and work from within against the regime. Fourth, the Brotherhood had a strong monopoly over schools, thus enabling it to indoctrinate many children and young adults.
Islamic terrorism reached its peak in June 1979 when the Artillery School was attacked in Aleppo, resulting in the deaths of all its young Ba’athist cadets. Not all of the victims of the violence were Alawi Ba’athists; indeed even members of the Sunni Muslim clergy were targeted by the Brothers and their militant allies. The most prominent victim was Sheikh Mohammad al-Shami, who was slain at his mosque, on February 2, 1980.
Faced with a relentless Islamist onslaught, the Ba’ath regime struck back with remarkable ferocity. At the Ba’ath party’s Seventh Regional Congress (December 23-January 6, 1980), Rifaat al-Asad, the president’s brother, famously proclaimed that loyalty was a must: he who is not with the Ba’ath at this stage is against it. [7] On June 26, 1980, the Brothers tried to kill Asad in Damascus and in turn, he passed law 49 on July 8, which stipulated that membership in the Brotherhood was a capital offense, punishable by death. The fighting peaked on February 2-3, 1982 in Hama, where the Brothers took to the mosque pulpits and called for a “total war” against the Ba’athist regime. Authorities responded with force, giving the Syrian Army orders to crush the insurgency. The army responded positively, crushing the insurgency, and killing many thousands in the process. The defeat in Hama was a massive setback for the Brothers who disappeared from the Syrian political landscape for the rest of the 1980s.
To compensate for the losses it inflicted in 1982, the regime constructed hundreds of mosques throughout the country, and encouraged people to be pious but not fundamentalist and militant, as the Brotherhood had been. This eventually back-fired as “backdoor” sermons on political Islam started to surface once again in the early 1990s. Fiery and militant preachers took over numerous mosques, and banned books by the legendary jihadi ideologue, Said Qutb, were distributed widely.
The U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in March-April 2003, has played an important part in reviving Syrian militant Islam. While some Americans regularly accuse Syria of giving shelter to an assortment of Iraqi and foreign militants – ranging from Saddam Hussein loyalists to Takfiris – the Syrian authorities and the wider public have to contend with the very real twin threat of the revival of the Brotherhood and its many militant and Salafist offshoots. The official position of the Syrian government is that it cooperates with the Americans, if only to neutralize the militant threat inside Syria. True, Syria did turn a blind eye to the fighters who crossed the border to fight in Iraq in 2003, but it soon corrected this policy.
When the fighters were defeated or deported back to Syria, a combination of frustration, anger and despair overtook them. Unable to strike at the Americans in Iraq or the Israelis in Palestine, they unleashed their anger on their fellow Syrians. In addition to the Mezzeh attack of 2004, a group of terrorists were apprehended, after a shooting that caused panic among picnickers, in July 2005 on Mount Qassioun overlooking the Syrian capital. Earlier in the summer of 2005, Syria announced that it had arrested one man and killed another who had been planning an attack in Damascus on behalf of Jund al-Sham, a terrorist organization that has recently emerged in the country.
In order to defeat political Islam in the long-term, the Ba’ath regime continues to promote moderate Islam through regime-friendly clerics like the deputy Mohammad Habash, the Aleppo-based preacher Mohammad Kamil al-Husayni, and new Grand Mufti Ahmad Hassoun, who has announced that he is categorically opposed to political and militant Islam. One of these clerics, for example, has a sign on the gates of his mosque in Aleppo saying: “No to explosions!” There is some speculation that in the event of the sudden demise of the Ba’ath regime, the Brothers and their militant allies would quickly acquire ownership of the Syrian state. Certainly the events in neighboring Iraq since the invasion should be a wake up call for Washington. In Iraq, the U.S.-led invasion has ironically buried Iraqi secularism for good, thus surrendering control of the political landscape to Shi’a and Sunni Islamists
Living in Damascus, one gets the feeling that although overt religiosity is increasing, not all religious people are willing to support, let alone fight for the Islamists. Yet, the Islamic groups do represent a certain segment of Syrian society that cannot be ignored. Recently, some reconciliation steps have been taken by the government, including several amnesties which have set free over 1,000 members of the Brotherhood. In September 2001, Asad allowed the return of Abu Fateh al-Baynouni, the brother of the party’s leader, Ali Sadreddine. [8] But the regime has made it clear that a return to organized political activity, for either the Brotherhood or any other Islamic party, is a red-line that the Islamists would cross at their peril. The regime, however, would be committing a grave mistake by not giving the Islamic activists a platform to express their views (as decided by the Ba’ath Party Conference of June 2005). True, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood remains dangerous, but turning a blind eye to it will not make them go away, nor will it make them any less pernicious.
Notes:
1. Author’s interview with Dr Munir al-Ajlani, a deputy in Damascus in 1943 (September 2, 2000).
2. Ibid.
3. Bawwab, Sulayman. Mawsou’at A’lam Souriyya fi al-Qarn al-Ishreen (vol II 1999). Abu Ghuddah was exiled to Saudi Arabia and remained there until being pardoned in 1997 when he agreed, at the age of 80, to refrain from any political activity. When he died in February 1997, President Hafez al-Asad sent his condolences to the Abu Ghuddah family and his death was broadcasted on the 9:00 pm news on Syrian TV. This was considered the first rapprochement between the Asad regime and the Brotherhood after the events of 1979-1982.
4. Interview with Ali Sader al-Din al-Baynouni, the leader of the banned Muslim Brotherhood, on al-Jazeera TV on July 7, 1999. See also, Ta’ammulat Istratijiyya fi al-Ahdath al-Souriyya (Strategic Observations in Syrian Events), al-Hayat March 11, 2005.
5. Seale, Patrick. Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East p.93 (London 1988).
6. Interview with ex-President Amin al-Hafez on al-Jazeera TV, episode 12 (June 6, 2001).
7. Tishreen (July 1, 1980).
8. The Daily Star (September 21, 2001).
READ FULL STORY* * *
The Battle within Syria: An Interview with Muslim Brotherhood Leader Ali BayanouniBy Mahan Abedin
Ali Sadreddine Bayanouni
Ali Sadreddine Bayanouni was born in 1938 in Aleppo and brought up in a religious family, where his father and grandfather were both well known Muslim scholars. He joined the Muslim Brotherhood while in secondary school, in 1954, and went on to receive training as a lawyer. After spending time in prison, he emerged to become the deputy leader of the Brotherhood in 1977. He left Syria two years later and eventually settled in Jordan, where he remained for twenty years. He arrived in Britain as a political refugee in 2000, after the Jordanian authorities requested he leave the country. This interview was conducted on August 5, 2005 in London by Terrorism Monitor editor Mahan Abedin.
Mahan Abedin: How would you characterize the strength of the overall Islamic movement in Syria today?
Ali Bayanouni: There is a continuum of movements, with the Sufis at one end of the spectrum and the Salafis on the other. But there is a mainstream Islamic awakening in the country and the growing religiosity of the people testifies to this. The opposition parties regard the Muslim Brotherhood as the largest and most influential opposition force in Syria. The Syrian regime tries to frighten the West about the Brotherhood and our activities by claiming that any change in the country would facilitate the rise to power of Islamists. This is clearly an exaggeration and designed to prevent any meaningful political change inside the country.
MA: How optimistic are you about change in Syria?
AB: The status quo is unsustainable, especially if Syria is increasingly alienated by the outside world.
MA: Do you still regard the Alawis as a heretical sect?
AB: We do not discriminate against Alawis and as they say they are Muslims, we do not contest that. The problem of Syria remains political, a minority elite has seized a state and is oppressing the majority.
MA: What is your assessment of the pressures applied on Syria by the West, in particular the United States?
AB: These pressures are not designed to meet the interests of the Syrian people and instead work in favor of American and Israeli interests. Therefore we do not attach too much significance to these pressures. We work inside Syria and address the Syrian people directly. Moreover, we will never accept an Iraqi-style solution for Syria; in short we do not call for outside interference.
MA: What is your assessment of Syrian foreign policy?
AB: Syrian policy in Lebanon created a lot of problems, for instance keeping Emile Lahoud in power against the will of the Lebanese people is a very foolish move. More broadly the regime’s desire to please the United States at the expense of Syria’s relationship with Europe is an unwise move.
MA: Would you have liked for Syria to prolong its military presence in Lebanon?
AB: Of course not, especially because the Syrian regime repressed the Lebanese in the same manner that it has been repressing its own people for decades.
MA: How about Syria’s alliance with the Iranians and their support for Hezbollah?
AB: Syria has been exploiting Hezbollah for its own ends. They have used Hezbollah to consolidate their influence in the region.
MA: How would the Muslim Brotherhood manage Syria’s foreign policy?
AB: We would not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.
MA: How about Israel?
AB: Israel is occupying Palestinian and Syrian lands and these should be returned. It would be preferable to secure their return through peaceful and political means.
MA: Would you adopt a tougher policy on Israel?
AB: Nowadays the Syrian regime does not react against any Israeli aggression. They support the Islamic resistance in Lebanon and Palestine, but why don’t they support resistance against the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights?
MA: Let us discuss terrorism and Iraq. Are you aware of any Syrian involvement in the top leadership of al-Qaeda?
AB: It is possible. Some individual Syrians may be involved in al-Qaeda.
MA: How powerful are the Salafis inside Syria?
AB: Their influence is limited. Salafism has weak foundations in Syria, as the majority of Sunni Muslims subscribe to Sufism.
MA: Has the invasion and occupation of Iraq strengthened the position of Salafis and other Islamic extremists?
AB: The American intervention in Iraq has radicalized people all over the region.
MA: Do you envisage the outbreak of violence inside Syria, similar to what occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s?
AB: The situation is very unstable and even the slightest provocation can have very serious consequences. The events in Qamishli should have been a wake up call for the Syrian authorities.
MA: There were some small bombings in Damascus last year and the government reflexively blamed Islamic militants, do you believe them?
AB: There has been a lot of speculation on those bombings, and to date the Syrian government has not produced any evidence to back up its claims. The regime would like to portray itself as a victim of terrorism in order to gain sympathy in the international community and convince certain countries that they are fighting terrorism. Moreover, the Syrian government has given some lists to the CIA, identifying alleged terrorists. Even the names of some members and leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood falsely appear on these lists. Both the Americans and the Syrians have acknowledged that they cooperate together in the intelligence and security field.
MA: How extensive is this cooperation?
AB: The Syrians give the Americans any information they need. Moreover, the Americans send Syrian captives to Syria for tough interrogations.
MA: Do you know Mustafa Setmariam Nasar (Abu Musab al-Suri)?
AB: Mustafa Setmariam was originally a member of Marwan Hadeed’s Fighting Vanguard, but he left that organization in 1981. Afterwards he traveled extensively, staying in Afghanistan, Spain and the UK.
MA: What more do you know about him?
AB: Mustafa Setmariam received his political and ideological training from Adnan Oqla and other Fighting Vanguard members. He was a highly extravagant individual. We don’t know much about his activities today, but it is clear that he has become a Takfiri icon.
MA: Is it true he is currently in Iraq?
AB: I have not had any verifiable information on him since 1981.
MA: Does Nasar have a lot of influence on the youth in Syria?
AB: The repression of the Ba’athist regime has created an environment conducive to the growth of these extreme ideologies and methodologies.
MA: What do you make of reports that foreign fighters are accessing Iraq through Syria?
AB: It is well known that initially the Syrian government wanted to keep the Americans under pressure in Iraq. But recently, especially after U.S. pressures, the Syrians have begun detaining mujahideen and tend to send them back to their countries.
MA: What is the situation right now; is the Syrian government complicit in the transit of fighters into Iraq?
AB: Many of the transit operations could not have taken place without the knowledge of Syrian intelligence.
MA: So the Syrian government is complicit in the transit of fighters?
AB: There is no doubt about that.
MA: But how do you explain the fact that on the one hand the Syrians give sensitive information to the Americans, and on the other create real difficulties for them in Iraq?
AB: Syria does not wish America to succeed in Iraq. But in order to ease the pressures they cooperate with them in this so-called war on terrorism.
MA: How extensive is the transit of fighters from Syria to Iraq?
AB: During the early months of the war the transfer was extensive. In that period even many Syrians left to fight in Iraq. Today if these individuals come back to Syria they are immediately detained. But I must stress we do not have accurate information on the extent of transit operations.
MA: What about reports that remnants of the former Iraqi regime are operating in Syria?
AB: A branch of the Iraqi Ba’ath was historically controlled by the Syrian government.
MA: I am not talking about the pro-Syrian left-wing of the Iraqi Ba’ath; I am referring to remnants of the regime that sought sanctuary in Syria following the fall of Baghdad.
AB: Saddam Hussein established good relations with the Syrians, 3 years before the fall of Baghdad. For instance they prevented the Syrian opposition in Baghdad from criticizing the Syrian regime too harshly. This 3 year period enabled both regimes to develop friendly relations, and the flight of remnants of the Saddam regime to Damascus must be seen in this context.
MA: What is the position of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood on the situation in Iraq?
AB: We believe that Iraq is an occupied country. The Americans invaded to serve their own interests, not to liberate the Iraqi people. The chaos prevailing in Iraq today is a direct consequence of the occupation. Resistance against occupation is the legal and moral right of all people. The Iraqi Islamic Party has adopted peaceful resistance, but others are fighting through different means.
MA: Do you think the empowerment of Iraqi Shi’as makes it less likely for Syrian Sunnis to overthrow the Alawi-based regime?
AB: No, I don’t think there are any direct relationships here.
MA: Do you think Syria could be invaded by the Americans?
AB: No, America will not repeat that experience in Syria.
MA: Now, let us discuss the Muslim Brotherhood and your own role in more detail. Firstly, is the Syrian government still terrorizing the opposition in the West?
AB: Yes, they focus particularly on the Islamic opposition.
MA: Have you been harassed by Syrian government agents here in London?
AB: They used to tell the British government that I have links to al-Qaeda, but of course the British do not believe their propaganda.
MA: What is your current position in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood?
AB: I am the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (MB). I am responsible for all the global activities of the Syrian MB organization.
MA: What is the nature of your work here?
AB: I lead the political and media activities. More broadly I attend to any other pressing matter relating to the Syrian MB.
MA: Do you also directly supervise MB activities inside Syria?
AB: Law no. 49 in Syria authorizes the killing of anyone affiliated with the
MB, therefore we avoid an organizational presence.
MA: How do people inside the country maintain contact with the party?
AB: We only keep general contacts. One month ago a child of 14 was sentenced to death for alleged involvement with the MB after returning from exile, but his sentence was lowered to 6 years in prison.
MA: How extensive are your secret activities in the country?
AB: We have members inside Syria, but we avoid giving these activities any identifiable structure.
MA: How closely were you personally involved in the events of the late 1970s and early 1980s?
AB: I was the deputy leader at that time and I can tell you that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood had no involvement in violent events whatsoever. Two influential people in particular reacted to Ba’athist repression in a violent manner; Adnan Oqla, who was dismissed from the MB five years before the outbreak of full scale violence and Ibrahim el-Youssef, who was an officer in the Syrian army and a Ba’athist with no relations to the MB whatsoever. The Syrian MB issued a statement condemning the massacre at the artillery school in Aleppo in 1979 committed by Oqla and el-Youssef. The authorities blamed the Brotherhood for the event simply because they wanted more excuses to deepen and intensify the repression.
MA: But what about al-Tali’a al-Muqatila [The Fighting Vanguard], were they not closely associated with the Syrian MB?
AB: Some groups affiliated to Marwan Hadeed adopted that name [Fighting Vanguard], but when the Brotherhood found out about their association, it expelled them from the party and canceled their membership. Most of the events that occurred in the late 1970s and 1980s, particularly events involving violence, were beyond the control of the Brotherhood. It was the Syrian people who rose up to defend Islam and the Brotherhood in the face of the aggressions of the Ba’ath regime. The conflict acquired a sectarian characteristic because most of the influential people in the Syrian regime came from the Alawite sect. This imbalanced sectarian representation in a diverse society inevitably created instability and frustration among the Sunni majority and led to a massive confrontation.
MA: Are you referring to the events of Hama in February 1982?
AB: Hama is a stronghold of Sunni Islam in Syria and well known for its resistance against French colonialism and it is not surprising that its people were the most frustrated under the circumstances. The MB leadership asked the Brothers not to fight in the city and to withdraw from the battle, but the military forces besieged the city and bombarded it for 3 weeks.
MA: Does the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood categorically reject violence?
AB: We have always rejected violence, and have a long history of participating in the political life of Syria, but the Baath regime created conditions under which no political party could engage in peaceful political activism. All documents of the party outline our peaceful approach.
MA: How do you explain the decline of the MB after the events in Hama?
AB: The regime destroyed three quarters of Hama, and repressed popular uprisings in other cities in a similar fashion. The brutality of the Syrian regime, and its willingness to use conventional military capabilities against its own civilian population, is unparalleled in modern history. They detained over 60,000 people in that period.
MA: So unprecedented repression was the only cause of the decline?
AB: After the coup d’etat in 1963 all political parties were harshly repressed in Syria, but the Brotherhood, because of its size and the serious threat it posed to the Ba’athists, received the harshest treatment. But in spite of this repression, in particular the massacres of the early 1980s we remain the largest opposition force.
MA: What has happened to the leaders of the struggle? I refer specifically to Adnan Saad al-Din, Said Hawa and Issam al-Attar.
AB: Sheikh Said Hawa died more than 15 years ago. Issam al-Attar has been leading the Talaa’i organization in Germany since the late 1970s. Our relationship is very good and we meet regularly. Attar leads a loose organization that works mainly with non-Syrian Muslims; hence Attar is no longer exclusively engaged with Syria. But the aims and objectives of his organization are very similar to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. We coordinate and consult closely on Syria-related issues. As for Adnan Saad al-Din, he left the Muslim Brotherhood in 1986 and formed a breakaway faction. This breakaway faction rejoined the main body of the MB in 1991, but Saad al-Din never again returned to the party. But we still maintain a good relationship.
READ INTERVIEW
